

Helping you Achieve Highest Grades in IB

IB History Higher Level (HL) Question Paper

Fully inlined with first assessment 2017 and suitable for
students sitting exams 2026+

Paper: 1

Source-based Paper Based on the five Prescribed Subjects

Subject 1 - Military Leaders

Marks: 66

Total Marks: / 66

Suitable for HL Students sitting the 2026 exams onwards
However, SL students may also find these resources useful

Questions

18M.1.BP.TZ0.1

Source A

Sayf al-Din Wahidi, an illuminator, depicts a group of diplomats sent to Genghis Khan by Emperor Xuanzong of Jin. In order to retain his position, Xuanzong sends gifts, including the Princess Qiguo (on horseback), and promises to become a vassal. From *The Compendium of Chronicles* by Rashid-al-Din Hamadani (early 14th century) in an edition c1430–1434.



[Source: This work is in the public domain (PD-1923)]

Source B

'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, a Muslim historian, writing in the non-contemporary chronicle *History of the World Conqueror* (mid to late 13th century.)

The Mongols ordered that, apart from four hundred artisans and some children whom they bore off into captivity ... the whole population, including the women and [the rest of the] children, should be killed, and no one be spared. The people of Merv were then distributed among the soldiers and, in short, to each man was allotted the execution of three or four hundred persons ... So many had been killed by nightfall that ... the plain was soaked with the blood of the mighty ...

[At Nishapur] they severed the heads of the slain from their bodies and heaped them in piles, keeping those of the men separate from those of the women and children ...

Flies and wolves feasted on the breasts of sadrs [religious dignitaries]; eagles on mountain tops regaled [filled] themselves with the flesh of delicate women.

[Source: Text adapted from Stephen Turnbull, from *Essential Histories: Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400* © Osprey Publishing part of Bloomsbury]

a.

What, according to Source B, happened to the populations of Merv and Nishapur?

[3]

b.

What does Source A suggest about Genghis Khan's relations with other leaders?

[2]

18M.1.BP.TZ0.2

Source C

Kanishk Tharoor, a writer and broadcaster, writing in the article "Lost cities #5: how the magnificent city of Merv was razed [destroyed] – and never recovered" in the series about lost cities published in the British newspaper *The Guardian* (2016).

[At its height] Merv was a cultural capital, attracting the brightest thinkers and artists from around the Islamic world ... To be marwazi (from Merv) suggested a degree of cultivation and sophistication ... Though secluded in an oasis in the Karakum desert, Merv was a worldly city, an exemplar of the commercial and intellectual culture that flourished along the Silk Road.

Merv was also no stranger to political upheaval and war ... [but no] conquest was as traumatic as its pillage by the Mongols in 1221 ... According to the [Muslim] historian Ibn al-Athir, who based his account on the reports of refugees from Merv: "Genghis Khan ordered the troops who had been seized should be brought before him ... they were executed and the people looked on and wept. When it came to the common people, they separated men, women, children and possessions ... They took the wealthy people and beat them and tortured them with all sorts of cruelties in the search for wealth ... Then they set fire to the city and burned the tomb of Sultan Sanjar and dug up his grave looking for money. They said, 'These people have resisted us' so they killed them all."

[Source: Kanishk Tharoor, "Lost cities #5: how the magnificent city of Merv was razed – and never recovered", *The Guardian*. www.theguardian.com]

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source C for an historian studying the Mongol conquests under Genghis Khan.

18N.1.BP.TZ0.1

**Source A**


Philip Potter, an author of popular history books, writing in the book *Gothic Kings of Britain: The lives of 31 Medieval Rulers, 1016–1399* (2009).

Henry II designated his eldest son, the younger Henry, as the successor to Anjou, Normandy and England, while Richard was granted Aquitaine and the fourth son, Geoffrey, was bequeathed Brittany. Nevertheless, the king refused to relinquish any sovereignty to his heirs and, as they grew older, the lack of independent authority gave cause for rebellion. At Queen Eleanor's urging, Richard joined the insurrection of his older brother. The rebels met in Paris at the court of Louis VII where a formidable alliance was formed ... resulting in the agreement to wage war against Henry II. In July 1173, the allies invaded Normandy, where Richard gained his first experience in battle. However, the attacks against the Plantagenet crown were inconclusive and in September the monarch offered to reconcile with his sons, proposing generous financial terms but no power. The offer was rejected and the conflict renewed, with Henry II taking the offensive by mounting an assault against Anjou with a formidable army. As his father succeeded in re-imposing his control over large sections of Poitou, Richard assumed his first independent command to resist his father's attack ... The revolt continued through the summer as Richard's military might deteriorated under the relentless pressure of the Plantagenet [Henry II's] counter-campaign. Finally, on 23 September 1174, at Poitiers he agreed to peace terms, accepting a reduced financial settlement and renewing his homage for Aquitaine.

[Source: from *Gothic Kings of Britain: The Lives of 31 Medieval Rulers, 1016–1399* © 2009 Philip J. Potter
by permission of McFarland & Company, Inc., Box 611, Jefferson NC 28640.
www.mcfarlandbooks.com.]

Source B

Matthew Paris, an English chronicler and artist, depicts Henry II (left), Richard I (right) and the younger Henry (in the middle), in the book *English History* (1250).



[Source: The British Library, http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=royal_ms_14_c_vii_f008v]

a.

What, according to Source A, were the actions taken by Richard I against Henry II?

[3]

b. What does Source B suggest about the nature of medieval leadership?

[2]

18N.1.BP.TZ0.2

Source C

William of Newburgh, an historian, writing in the chronicle *The History of English Affairs* (completed c1198). Much of the chronicle was based on the writings of others.

The younger Henry, by the advice of the French, devising evil from every source against his father, went secretly into Aquitaine, where his two brothers, Richard and Geoffrey, resided with their mother; and with her connivance [plotting], brought them with him into France. Their father had granted Aquitaine to one and Brittany to the other. Hence the younger Henry believed, from the suggestions of the French, that the people of Aquitaine and Brittany would, because of Richard, support him as would the Bretons under Geoffrey. The younger Henry also allied himself to the count of Flanders—a man of great power and immoderate presumption [arrogance]. The younger Henry gained the count's support by making great promises with the consent of the king of France [Louis VII]. Then many powerful and noble persons— in England and in foreign parts—driven by

hatred, which until then they had hidden, or persuaded by promises of the vainest kind, began by degrees to desert the father for the son, and to make every preparation for war.

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source C for an historian studying the revolt of Richard I and his brothers against Henry II between 1173 and 1174.

18N.1.BP.TZ0.3

Source A

Philip Potter, an author of popular history books, writing in the book *Gothic Kings of Britain: The lives of 31 Medieval Rulers, 1016–1399* (2009).

Henry II designated his eldest son, the younger Henry, as the successor to Anjou, Normandy and England, while Richard was granted Aquitaine and the fourth son, Geoffrey, was bequeathed Brittany. Nevertheless, the king refused to relinquish any sovereignty to his heirs and, as they grew older, the lack of independent authority gave cause for rebellion. At Queen Eleanor's urging, Richard joined the insurrection of his older brother. The rebels met in Paris at the court of Louis VII where a formidable alliance was formed ... resulting in the agreement to wage war against Henry II. In July 1173, the allies invaded Normandy, where Richard gained his first experience in battle. However, the attacks against the Plantagenet crown were inconclusive and in September the monarch offered to reconcile with his sons, proposing generous financial terms but no power. The offer was rejected and the conflict renewed, with Henry II taking the offensive by mounting an assault against Anjou with a formidable army. As his father succeeded in re-imposing his control over large sections of Poitou, Richard assumed his first independent command to resist his father's attack ... The revolt continued through the summer as Richard's military might deteriorated under the relentless pressure of the Plantagenet [Henry II's] counter-campaign. Finally, on 23 September 1174, at Poitiers he agreed to peace terms, accepting a reduced financial settlement and renewing his homage for Aquitaine.

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www.mcfarlandbooks.com.]

Source D

David Harris Willson, a professor of history, writing in the academic book *A History of England* (1972).

Henry, it was said, could rule every household but his own. His sons grew up discontented and hostile towards him ... Henry was partly to blame. As a parent, he was indulgent yet controlling, giving his sons titles but little money or power, he sent them to represent him in various parts of his dominions but expected them to be as obedient as paid officials ... The three older brothers, encouraged by their mother Eleanor, were eager to revolt against their father ...

Louis VII of France also encouraged Henry's sons to revolt. The great rebellion of 1173–1174, which included risings in England, Normandy, Brittany and Aquitaine, was managed—or, rather, mismanaged—by Louis. The widespread nature of the revolt made it dangerous. But Henry was supported by the Church, by his great officials, by the smaller tenants in the country, and by the towns. [Also,] his sons were too young to lead so extensive an enterprise, Louis was incompetent and there was little overall planning. Hence, the revolt was put down, as it had arisen, gradually. Louis was driven back to Paris, an invasion of England from Flanders was defeated and Eleanor was captured. Henry forgave his sons and increased their revenues.

[Source: from WILLSON. *HISTORY OF ENGLAND 3/E*, 3E. © 1984 South-Western, a part of Cengage, Inc.

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Compare and contrast what Sources A and D reveal about the revolt against Henry II.

18N.1.BP.TZ0.4

Source A

Philip Potter, an author of popular history books, writing in the book *Gothic Kings of Britain: The lives of 31 Medieval Rulers, 1016–1399* (2009).


Henry II designated his eldest son, the younger Henry, as the successor to Anjou, Normandy and England, while Richard was granted Aquitaine and the fourth son, Geoffrey, was bequeathed Brittany. Nevertheless, the king refused to relinquish any sovereignty to his heirs and, as they grew older, the lack of independent authority gave cause for rebellion. At Queen Eleanor's urging, Richard joined the insurrection of his older brother. The rebels met in Paris at the court of Louis VII where a formidable alliance was formed ... resulting in the agreement to wage war against Henry II. In July 1173, the allies invaded Normandy, where Richard gained his first experience in battle. However, the attacks against the Plantagenet crown were inconclusive and in September the monarch offered to reconcile with his sons, proposing generous financial terms but no power. The offer was rejected and the conflict renewed, with Henry II taking the offensive by mounting an assault against Anjou with a formidable army. As his father succeeded in re-imposing his control over large sections of Poitou, Richard assumed his first independent command to resist his father's attack ... The revolt continued through the summer as Richard's military might deteriorated under the relentless pressure of the Plantagenet [Henry II's] counter-campaign. Finally, on 23 September 1174, at Poitiers he agreed to peace terms, accepting a reduced financial settlement and renewing his homage for Aquitaine.

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Source B

Matthew Paris, an English chronicler and artist, depicts Henry II (left), Richard I (right) and the younger Henry (in the middle), in the book *English History* (1250).



[Source: The British Library, http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=royal_ms_14_c_vii_f008v]

Source C

William of Newburgh, an historian, writing in the chronicle *The History of English Affairs* (completed c1198). Much of the chronicle was based on the writings of others.

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Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the view that Henry II's insistence on retaining power was the main reason for the revolt of 1173 to 1174.

19M.1.BP.TZ0.1

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The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 —
Leadership: rise to power; uniting of rival tribes.

Source A


Jean-Paul Roux, an historian specializing in Asian history, writing in the introductory study *Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire* (2003).

The Turco-Mongols long believed that there could be only one emperor on earth just as there was only one god in heaven. In other words, Togrul the Kerait and Temujin [Genghis] the Mongol could not rule side by side. They confronted one another in 1203 [but Togrul fled and died soon after]. Temujin annexed Togrul's lands and his people and became the true master of eastern and central Mongolia. The Naiman no longer had power against him. They searched for an ally who could push the Mongols back and thought they would find support among the Onggut, but the Onggut chose instead to warn Temujin. Although the Naiman hoped to surprise him, it was they who were taken unawares. They collapsed with the first attack. [The future] Genghis Khan would never forget the favour shown to him by the Onggut. Temujin now controlled all of Mongolia.

[Source: French text from Jean-Paul Roux, in *Genghis Khan et L'Empire mongol*, © Éditions Gallimard; Spanish and German text translated by International Baccalaureate Organization from the original French with permission of Gallimard;
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Gengis Khan et l'Empire mongol by Toula Balla. Copyright © Gallimard 2002. English translation
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Source D

A map of the Mongol Empire and its neighbouring empires in 1207 and 1227.



[Source: © International Baccalaureate Organization 2019]

a.

What, according to Source A, were the consequences of the struggle between Temujin [Genghis] and Togrul?

[3]

b. What does Source D suggest about the power of Genghis Khan by 1207?

[2]

19M.1.BP.TZ0.2

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 — Leadership: rise to power; uniting of rival tribes.

Source C

An unknown author, likely a member of the Borjigids (the imperial clan of Genghis Khan), describes the lead up to the fight against the Naimans, in the record of the affairs of the Borjigids, often known as *Secret History of the Mongols* (c1228).

Alakush [Khan of the Ongguts] sent a messenger to Chingis [Genghis] saying "Tayang of the Naimans is going to come and snatch your bows and arrows, and he asked me to be his right hand. I refused and now wish to inform you of this." When Chingis received this message, he held a council. Many of those present said, "Our horses are lean, it is a bad moment for us" ... [but others] said "the Naimans think that because their country is

large and their people many they have the right to brag. Here is our opportunity to seize their bows and arrows" ...

On the sixteenth day of the fourth month of the Year of the Rat (1204) Chingis [Genghis] went off to fight against the Naimans ... Chingis with his main army reached the Sa'ari Steppe and camped there. Dodai-cherbi [a military commander] said to Chingis "We are few in number and have travelled a long way. We had better turn out our horses to graze and establish decoy troops in large numbers all over the Sa'ari Steppe (that is people of all kinds, other than combatants [fighters], were to be disguised as soldiers). At night, everyone should light five fires. The Naimans are great in force, but their ruler is timid and weak. He has never been far from home and will certainly be bewildered [confused] and deceived. Then, when our horses have eaten enough, we will push back their scouts, make straight for their main camp and fall upon them before they have time to draw up in battle order. In this way we should be sure to win." Chingis took his advice.

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source C for an historian studying the rise to power of Genghis Khan.

19M.1.BP.TZ0.3

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 — Leadership: rise to power; uniting of rival tribes.

Source B

George Lane, a professor of the history of the Middle East and central Asia, writing in the academic book *Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule* (2004).

Temujin felt insecure knowing that one great tribal grouping, the Naiman, remained beyond his control ... If Temujin could defeat the Naiman, his enemies would have nowhere to shelter and he would be undisputed leader of the unified Turco-Mongol steppe tribes. With so much at stake Temujin could not risk failure, and so he devised a careful plan ...

On the day of the Feast of the Moon in the Year of the Rat (1204) Temujin led his troops into battle. To raise the morale of his own limited forces and intimidate the numerically superior Naiman, he employed a strategy that he was to use to great effect in future conflicts. By lighting countless camp-fires, mounting dummies on spare horses, and trailing branches and bushes from their own horses, the Mongols were able to create the impression that their numbers were far greater than they actually were.

The Mongols' victory was total. Following this victory, all the other tribes that had once thought of independence were quick to promise their full loyalty. Only the Merkits attempted to escape, but within the same year they too had been destroyed.

[Source: republished with permission of ABC-CLIO, from *Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule*, George Lane, 2004; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.]

Source C

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Compare and contrast what Sources B and C reveal about Genghis Khan's [Temujin's] fight with the Naiman in 1204.

19M.1.BP.TZ0.4

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 — Leadership: rise to power; uniting of rival tribes.

Source A

Jean-Paul Roux, an historian specializing in Asian history, writing in the introductory study *Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire* (2003).

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Source C


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A map of the Mongol Empire and its neighbouring empires in 1207 and 1227.



[Source: © International Baccalaureate Organization 2019]

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 — Leadership: rise to power; uniting of rival tribes.

Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree that Genghis Khan rose to power because of his military strength?

19N.1.BP.TZ0.1

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan (c1200–1227) — Impact: Political impact: administration; overthrowing of existing ruling systems; establishment of Mongol law/Yassa; move towards meritocracy.

Source B

A detail from a Persian manuscript depicting Genghis Khan and his wife seated on a throne in a tent that is surrounded by horses and camels (15th century).



[Source: DEA / M. SEEMULLER / Getty Images]

Source A

David O Morgan, a university professor of Mongol history writing in the academic paper "The 'Great Yassa of Chingiz [Genghis] Khan' and Mongol Law in the Ilkhanate" for the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (1986).

Let me first of all outline the view that is usually taken of the Yassa. At some time during his reign and probably at the *quriltai* [council] of 1206, Chingiz [Genghis] Khan instituted a code of laws which were to be binding on his people and their descendants for ever. This was a codification of the ancestral traditions, customs, laws and ideas of the Mongols, to which Chingiz Khan added further laws of his own devising. Copies of this great code, the Yassa, were kept in the treasuries of the Mongol princes for consultation as need arose. No complete copy has survived, but it is possible to assemble "fragments" of the code from various sources, and by careful study of these fragments the general pattern of the Yassa can be recovered.

[Source: David O. Morgan, 'The "Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān" and Mongol law in the Ilkhānate', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, (1), 163–176, reproduced with permission]

- a. What, according to Source A, was the Yassa? [3]
- b. What does Source B suggest about Genghis Khan's administration? [2]

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan (c1200–1227) — Impact: Political impact: administration; overthrowing of existing ruling systems; establishment of Mongol law/Yassa; move towards meritocracy.

Source D

'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, a Muslim historian, writing in the non-contemporary chronicle *History of the World Conqueror* (mid to late 13th century).

[Genghis Khan] established a rule for every occasion and a regulation for every circumstance; while for every crime he fixed a penalty. And since the Tartar peoples had no script of their own, he gave orders that Mongol children should learn writing from the Uighur [a Muslim minority ethnic group]; and that these *Yasas* [Yassas] and ordinances should be written down on rolls. These rolls are called the *Great Book of Yasas* and are kept in the treasury of the chief princes. Wherever a khan ascends the throne, or a great army is mobilized, or the princes assemble ... concerning affairs of state and the administration thereof, they produce these rolls and model their actions thereon; and proceed with the disposition [deployment] of armies or the destruction of provinces and cities in the manner therein prescribed.

[Source: 'Ala-Ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, *Genghis Khan: The History Of The World Conqueror*, translated from the text of Mizra Muhammad Qazvini by J. A. Boyle, UNESCO Publishing and Manchester University Press, 1997. 2004, p. 25]

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source D for an historian studying the role of Genghis Khan in establishing the Yassa.

Source B James W Glass, an American painter, depicts Richard the Lionheart in the historical scene *Richard, Coeur de Lion* [Lionheart], on his way to Jerusalem (1854).



[Source: Image provided courtesy of the Art Renewal Center©, ARC, www.artrenewal.org.]

Source D Jean Flori, an historian specializing in the Crusades, writing in the academic book *Richard the Lionheart: King and Knight* (2006).

So, if we are to believe him [Richard I], it was to avoid the dishonour of a defeat for the whole army that Richard refused to lead the crusader army to the walls of Jerusalem. Instead, he proposed an expedition against Egypt. The matter was put before the council of barons, which consisted of twenty men. To the immense despair of the majority of crusaders, the council opted for the overland expedition to Egypt, supported by a fleet stationed off the coast. The advice of the local lords had been taken, which confirmed the strategic logic of Richard's choice in their eyes. But it was profoundly shocking to many of the crusaders and, once again, the French went their own way. Hugh, Duke of Burgundy, seized the opportunity to spread defamatory [offensive] stories about the King of England and songs accusing him of cowardice ... The army was deeply divided and, in these circumstances, all idea of taking Jerusalem had to be abandoned. It was a failure both for the crusaders and for Richard, whose prestige was badly damaged. Worse, he must have wondered whether he had lost out on both fronts: by agreeing to remain in the Holy Land until the following Easter, he had seriously endangered the future of his empire in the West, leaving the field clear for his brother John, without the compensation of the successes he had counted on in the East.

[Source: Jean Flori, *Richard the Lionheart*. Copyright © 2006 by Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.]

a.

What, according to Source D, were the consequences of Richard I's refusal to take Jerusalem?

[3]

b. What does Source B suggest about Richard I's march towards Jerusalem? [2]

20N.1.BP.TZ0.2

Source A Richard I, speaking prior to the Third Crusade, as recorded in the contemporary chronicle *The History of the Holy War*.

You will never see me lead a campaign for which I can be criticised, and I do not care if I am disliked for it. Know for certain that wherever our army go, Saladin knows what we are about and what our strength is. We are a long way from the sea, and if he and his Saracens were to come down on the plains of the city of Ramla and intercept our provisions ... this would not be wise for those who would be besieging ... and if I were to lead the army and besiege Jerusalem, and such a thing were to happen ... then I would be forever blamed, shamed and less loved. I know in truth and without doubt that there are those here and in France who would have wanted and greatly desire that I should do such a thing, which would everywhere be told to my shame.

[Source: Adapted from Ailes, M and Malcolm B, eds. 2003 *The History of the Holy War: Ambroise's Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, p.168, Woodbridge. Boydell Press.]

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source A for an historian studying Richard I's involvement in the Third Crusade.

20N.1.BP.TZ0.3

Source C John Gillingham, professor of medieval history, writing in the academic book *Richard I* (1999).

It might be argued that if Richard could not recapture Jerusalem, none the less he conquered Cyprus ... Whenever possible he chose options—the conquest of Cyprus, the recovery of the coastal cities of Palestine, a campaign against Egypt—which made strategic sense and which brought substantial and lasting gain for the shattered Christian presence in the Middle East. To a remarkable degree most, though not all, contemporaries and near contemporaries adopted non-religious criteria in assessing his conduct of the crusade. Even monks recognized and admired his prowess [skill] and his conquests ... Yet it is unlikely that anyone ever went on crusade in more extraordinary circumstances than Richard did, when the wiser thing would have been to stay at home. His problem was that he came to the throne in 1189 having been betrothed [engaged] for the last twenty years to Alice, a sister of the reigning king of France, Philip Augustus. Alice had been in the custody of Richard's father, Henry II, who had not been able to resist the temptation to seduce her. Richard decided that this made it impossible for him to marry her. But to send her back to her brother after twenty years would be an enormous insult to the honour of the French royal house.

[Source: Adapted from Gillingham, J., 1999. *Richard I*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 4–5.]

Source D Jean Flori, an historian specializing in the Crusades, writing in the academic book *Richard the Lionheart: King and Knight* (2006).

So, if we are to believe him [Richard I], it was to avoid the dishonour of a defeat for the whole army that Richard refused to lead the crusader army to the walls of Jerusalem. Instead, he proposed an expedition against Egypt. The matter was put before the council of barons, which consisted of twenty men. To the immense despair of the majority of crusaders, the council opted for the overland expedition to Egypt, supported by a fleet stationed off the coast. The advice of the local lords had been taken, which confirmed the strategic logic of Richard's choice in their eyes. But it was profoundly shocking to many of the crusaders and, once again, the French went their own way. Hugh, Duke of Burgundy, seized the opportunity to spread defamatory [offensive] stories about the King of England and songs accusing him of cowardice ... The army was deeply divided and, in these circumstances, all idea of taking Jerusalem had to be abandoned. It was a failure both for the crusaders and for Richard, whose prestige was badly damaged. Worse, he must have wondered whether he had lost out on both fronts: by agreeing to remain in the Holy Land until the following Easter, he had seriously endangered the future of his empire in the West, leaving the field clear for his brother John, without the compensation of the successes he had counted on in the East.

[Source: Jean Flori, *Richard the Lionheart*. Copyright © 2006 by Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.]

Compare and contrast what Sources C and D reveal about Richard I's participation in the Third Crusade.

20N.1.BP.TZ0.4

Source A Richard I, speaking prior to the Third Crusade, as recorded in the contemporary chronicle *The History of the Holy War*.

You will never see me lead a campaign for which I can be criticised, and I do not care if I am disliked for it. Know for certain that wherever our army go, Saladin knows what we are about and what our strength is. We are a long way from the sea, and if he and his Saracens were to come down on the plains of the city of Ramla and intercept our provisions ... this would not be wise for those who would be besieging ... and if I were to lead the army and besiege Jerusalem, and such a thing were to happen ... then I would be forever blamed, shamed and less loved. I know in truth and without doubt that there are those here and in France who would have wanted and greatly desire that I should do such a thing, which would everywhere be told to my shame.

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[Source: Image provided courtesy of the Art Renewal Center©, ARC, www.artrenewal.org.]

Source C John Gillingham, professor of medieval history, writing in the academic book *Richard I* (1999).

It might be argued that if Richard could not recapture Jerusalem, none the less he conquered Cyprus ... Whenever possible he chose options—the conquest of Cyprus, the recovery of the coastal cities of Palestine, a campaign against Egypt—which made strategic sense and which brought substantial and lasting gain for the shattered Christian presence in the Middle East. To a remarkable degree most, though not all, contemporaries and near contemporaries adopted non-religious criteria in assessing his conduct of the crusade. Even monks recognized and admired his prowess [skill] and his conquests ... Yet it is unlikely that anyone ever went on crusade in more extraordinary circumstances than Richard did, when the wiser thing would have been to stay at home. His problem was that he came to the throne in 1189 having been betrothed [engaged] for the last twenty years to Alice, a sister of the reigning king of France, Philip Augustus. Alice had been in the custody of Richard's father, Henry II, who had not been able to resist the temptation to seduce her. Richard decided that this made it impossible for him to marry her. But to send her back to her brother after twenty years would be an enormous insult to the honour of the French royal house.

[Source: Adapted from Gillingham, J., 1999. *Richard I*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 4–5.]

Source D Jean Flori, an historian specializing in the Crusades, writing in the academic book *Richard the Lionheart: King and Knight* (2006).

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[Source: Jean Flori, *Richard the Lionheart*. Copyright © 2006 by Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.]

Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate Richard I's contribution to the Third Crusade.

21M.1.BP.TZ0.1

Source D Peter Dunn, an English illustrator, in a twentieth-century depiction of Clifford's Tower, York, during the attack on the Jews in 1190. The Jews had fled to the tower for safety.





[Source: © Historic England Archive.]

What does Source D reveal about anti-Jewish violence in York in 1190?

21M.1.BP.TZ0.2

Source A John Gillingham, an historian specializing in medieval history, writing in the academic book *Richard I* (2002).

While celebrations went on inside the palace, a riot developed outside. Some Jews, bringing gifts for the new king, had tried to enter, but the Christian crowd at the gates would not allow it. They fell upon the Jews, killing some and wounding others. The trouble then spread to the city of London, where it continued throughout the night. Jews were killed, their houses robbed and burned down. Next day, Richard had some of the rioters arrested, three of them hanged. A Jew who in fear of his life had agreed to be baptized a Christian, Richard encouraged him to return to his religion. The king sent letters to every region ordering that the Jews should be left in peace ... Despite his efforts, there were more anti-Jewish riots in the next few months at Lynn, Norwich, Lincoln and Stamford. This wave of popular anti-Semitism [anti-Jewish feelings] reached its height at York in March 1190, by which time Richard had already left the country.

[Source: Gillingham, J. *Richard I*. Copyright © 1999 by John Gillingham. Reproduced with permission of The Licensor through PLSclear.]

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source A for an historian studying the treatment of the Jews during the reign of Richard I.

21M.1.BP.TZ0.4

Source A John Gillingham, an historian specializing in medieval history, writing in the academic book *Richard I* (2002).

While celebrations went on inside the palace, a riot developed outside. Some Jews, bringing gifts for the new king, had tried to enter, but the Christian crowd at the gates would not allow it. They fell upon the Jews, killing some and wounding others. The trouble then spread to the city of London, where it continued throughout the night. Jews were killed, their houses robbed and burned down. Next day, Richard had some of the rioters arrested, three of them hanged. A Jew who in fear of his life had agreed to be baptized a Christian, Richard encouraged him to return to his religion. The king sent letters to every region ordering that the Jews should be left in peace ... Despite his efforts, there were more anti-Jewish riots in the next few months at Lynn, Norwich, Lincoln and Stamford. This wave of popular anti-Semitism [anti-Jewish feelings] reached its height at York in March 1190, by which time Richard had already left the country.

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Source B Ephraim of Bonn, a Jewish scholar, writing in a manuscript in the 1190s.

In the year 1190, a group of knights attacked the Jews, in the city of York, on the Great Sabbath [before Passover]. The Jews fled to the house of prayer. Here Rabbi Yomtob stood and slaughtered sixty souls, and others were also killed. Some there commanded that they should slaughter their only sons. The number of those killed and burned was one hundred and fifty souls, men and women. Their houses also the knights destroyed, stole their gold and silver and many splendid books, precious as gold. These they brought to Cologne and to other places, where they sold them to the Jews.

[Source: Roth, C., *History of the Jews in England*, Cecil Roth, Oxford University Press, Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.]

Source D Peter Dunn, an English illustrator, in a twentieth-century depiction of Clifford's Tower, York, during the attack on the Jews in 1190. The Jews had fled to the tower for safety.



[Source: © Historic England Archive.]

Using the sources and your own knowledge, examine the view that there was limited protection for the Jews in England during the reign of Richard I.

17M.1.BP.TZ0.1

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source B

John Man, an historian specializing in Chinese and Mongolian history, writing in the biography *Genghis Khan, Life, Death and Resurrection* (2004).

The attack would not be easy. From a population ten times that of the Mongols, the Jin Emperor could draw cavalry and infantry numbering several hundred thousand, and his cities were well fortified.

Genghis's invasion was carefully planned. In spring 1211 the Mongols advanced across the Gobi, well spread out and in several waves in order not to drain the scattered wells and pools. This was a huge operation: imagine something like 100 000 warriors with 300 000 horses, strung out in perhaps 10–20 groups of 5 000 to 10 000 each, each with camel-drawn carts, and all linked by fast-moving messengers as the army travelled 800 kilometres.

As the Mongol army spilled into northern China and approached the pass that led to Beijing, the Jin commander seems to have made a fatal mistake. He had a chance of launching a surprise attack when the Mongols were looting. Instead, perhaps to win time, he sent an officer to discuss peace terms. The officer promptly defected [joined the opposing side] with the information that the Jin were waiting at the far end of the pass. There the Jin cavalry, packed between ridges, was overwhelmed by arrows and a Mongol charge. Horsemen turned and trampled their own infantry.

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source D

An unknown artist depicts Mongol horsemen and the conditions they faced as they battled Jin warriors in the mountains. From *The Compendium of Chronicles* by Rashid-al-Din Hamadani (early 14th century).



[Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mongol_horsemen_battle_Jin_mounted.jpg]

a.

What, according to Source B, were the problems facing the Mongols in launching an attack against the Jin?

[3]

b. What does Source D suggest about the Mongol battles with the Jin?

[2]

17M.1.BP.TZ0.2

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

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With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source B for an historian studying the Mongol invasion of north China.

17M.1.BP.TZ0.3

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source C

Frank McLynn, a military historian, writing in an academic biography, *Genghis Khan: His conquests, His empire, His legacy* (Dschingis Khan: Seine Eroberungen, sein Imperium, sein Vermächtnis) (2015).

The three pitched battles fought in September 1211 destroyed the Jin as a credible battlefield force. It is difficult to convey the extent of the Chinese losses at battles such as Badger Mouth, but nine years later travellers reported the fields of carnage still covered with bones. At the imperial court Chih-Chung was widely blamed for the disaster. It was said that he was too timid, that he should have attacked the Mongols with cavalry alone, and much earlier while they were still pillaging, but that he insisted on fighting with both cavalry and infantry on the field ...

Genghis ordered Jebe to take Chu-yung chuan, a fortified pass. Jebe found Nankou, the town at the end of the pass, too strong to be taken by assault so he pretended to retreat. All along the fifteen-mile pass were fortresses perched on steep slopes. At news of Jebe's retreat the soldiers all rushed out, eager to be in at the kill. Jebe led them on a chase for thirty-five miles, stretching them out so that the various groups of pursuers lost touch with each other. Then he turned and demolished them one group at a time, spreading panic that in the end led the defenders of Chu-yung chuan to surrender to the Mongols.

Early in November Genghis and the main army marched down the pass and pitched camp twenty miles from Peking [Beijing], accepting the surrender of three other important fortresses.

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

An anonymous author, writing for the Mongol royal family after Genghis Khan's death, in *The Secret history of the Mongols* (c14th century).

Genghis Khan set out to fight the people of north China. First he took the city of Fuzhou then marching through the Wild Fox Pass he took the city of Xuandefu. From here he sent out an army under Jebe's command to take the fortress of Zhuyongguan.

When Jebe arrived there he saw that it was well defended, so he said "I'll trick them and make them come out in the open. I'll pretend to retreat and when they come out, I'll attack them." So Jebe retreated and the north Chinese army cried "Let's go after them!" They poured out of their fortifications until the valleys and mountainsides were full of their soldiers. Jebe retreated to Sondi-i-wu Ridge and there he turned his army round to attack as the enemy rushed towards him in waves.

The north Chinese army was beaten. Close behind Jebe's forces came Genghis Khan, commanding the great Middle Army. They too attacked, forcing the north Chinese army to retreat.

Compare and contrast what Sources A and C reveal about the Jin defeats in 1211.

17M.1.BP.TZ0.4

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source B

John Man, an historian specializing in Chinese and Mongolian history, writing in the biography *Genghis Khan, Life, Death and Resurrection* (2004).

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The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source C

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The three pitched battles fought in September 1211 destroyed the Jin as a credible battlefield force. It is difficult to convey the extent of the Chinese losses at battles such as Badger Mouth, but nine years later travellers reported the fields of carnage still covered with bones. At the imperial court Chih-Chung was widely blamed for the disaster. It was said that he was too timid, that he should have attacked the Mongols with cavalry alone, and much earlier while they were still pillaging, but that he insisted on fighting with both cavalry and infantry on the field ...

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Early in November Genghis and the main army marched down the pass and pitched camp twenty miles from Peking [Beijing], accepting the surrender of three other important fortresses.

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source A

An anonymous author, writing for the Mongol royal family after Genghis Khan's death, in *The Secret history of the Mongols* (c14th century).


Genghis Khan set out to fight the people of north China. First he took the city of Fuzhou then marching through the Wild Fox Pass he took the city of Xuandefu. From here he sent out an army under Jebe's command to take the fortress of Zhuyongguan.

When Jebe arrived there he saw that it was well defended, so he said "I'll trick them and make them come out in the open. I'll pretend to retreat and when they come out, I'll attack them." So Jebe retreated and the north Chinese army cried "Let's go after them!" They poured out of their fortifications until the valleys and mountainsides were full of their soldiers. Jebe retreated to Sondi-i-wu Ridge and there he turned his army round to attack as the enemy rushed towards him in waves.

The north Chinese army was beaten. Close behind Jebe's forces came Genghis Khan, commanding the great Middle Army. They too attacked, forcing the north Chinese army to retreat.

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

An unknown artist depicts Mongol horsemen and the conditions they faced as they battled Jin warriors in the mountains. From *The Compendium of Chronicles* by Rashid-al-Din Hamadani (early 14th century).



[Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mongol_horsemen_battle_Jin_mounted.jpg]

Using the sources and your own knowledge, examine the view that Jin mistakes were the main reason for Genghis Khan's success in China.

17N.1.BP.TZ0.01

Source A

Morris Rossabi, a professor of Chinese and Central Asian history, writing in a general history book, *The Mongols: A Very Short Introduction* (2012).

A fragile economy in a demanding environment and a Chinese dynasty's denial of trade for vital products are a few of the general conditions that gave rise to the Mongol eruption [expansion] from their homeland, but the specific motivations for the Mongol assault on the rest of the world are in doubt. Their military superiority is often used as an explanation for their emergence. The toughness of steppe life, according to some scholars, compelled the Mongols to be aggressive, and their aggressiveness spilled over [developed] into attacks on neighbouring states. Other scholars assert that the Mongols' hunger for booty [riches] inevitably caused them to raid and assault the settled civilizations. Their military advantages and circumstances certainly enabled them to succeed spectacularly in the 13th century, but they do not explain the motives for the Mongol migrations into other lands. They tell us how the Mongols conquered much of Asia, but not why.

[Source: Republished with permission of Oxford University Press, From *The Mongols: A Very Short Introduction*, Morris Rossabi, 2012; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.]

Source D

Aleksandr Yezhov, an artist of historical scenes, depicts a Mongol cavalry archer and Mongol archers in an illustration for the Russian military history magazine *Бой* (Warrior) (2003).



[Source: "Mongol horse archers" by Giuseppe Rava; reproduced with the kind permission of the artist.]

a.

What, according to Source A, were the factors that encouraged Mongol expansion?

[3]

b.

What does Source D suggest about the Mongols' military equipment and tactics?

[2]

17N.1.BP.TZ0.02

Source C

Jack Weatherford, a professor of anthropology and a specialist in tribal peoples, writing in an academic book, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World* (2004).

[Mongol] tactics seemed to be, at least in part, a combination of older fighting techniques and hunting strategies; yet the consistent inability of the perplexed [confused] enemy to respond effectively to this form of warfare indicated that Temujin [Genghis Khan] had introduced enough innovation to make these strategies uniquely his own. Temujin had produced a new type of steppe army based on a greater variety of tactics and, most important, close cooperation among the men and complete obedience to their commanders. They were no longer an attacking horde of individuals; they were now a united formation. Temujin used a set of manoeuvres that each man had to know and to which each responded precisely and without hesitation. The Mongols had a saying: "If he sends me into fire or water I go. I go for him." The saying reflected not just an ideal, but the reality of the new Mongol warfare, and it made short order of [rapidly defeated] the Naiman.

[Source: Excerpt(s) from GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD by Jack Weatherford, copyright © 2004 by Jack Weatherford. Used by permission of Crown Books, an imprint of the Crown Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved. Any third party use of this material, outside of this publication, is prohibited. Interested parties must apply directly to Penguin Random House LLC for permission.]

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source C for an historian studying Genghis Khan's [Temujin's] military campaigns and tactics.

17N.1.BP.TZ0.03

Source B

Peter Jackson, a professor of medieval history, writing in an academic book, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410* (2005).

The cohesiveness of the Mongol military stood in sharp contrast with the disunity of their enemies, which Genghis Khan and his successors took care to exploit. The political fragmentation of early 13th-century Rus' under the prolific Riurikid dynasty is well known. But division also characterized the two most formidable powers confronting the Mongols. Jurchen rule was deeply resented by the Khitan still living in the borderlands of China, large numbers of whom joined the Mongols or coordinated their own operations against the Chin [Jin] with those of Mongol commanders. Subsequently, even native Chinese and Jurchen officers and troops defected to the invaders. In western Asia, the Khwarazm shah's bitter quarrel with the 'Abbasid Caliph impaired [weakened] his capacity to pose as a champion of orthodoxy and the Jihad, while the unreliability of significant elements in his recently gained dominions undermined his preparations for resistance. By contrast, the religious tolerance that characterized Genghis Khan's empire also served the Mongols well, so that the Gur-khan's Muslim subjects in eastern Turkestan, who had been persecuted by Kuchlug, welcomed them as liberators.

[Source: From: *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410*, Peter Jackson, 2014, Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

Source C

Jack Weatherford, a professor of anthropology and a specialist in tribal peoples, writing in an academic book, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World* (2004).

[Mongol] tactics seemed to be, at least in part, a combination of older fighting techniques and hunting strategies; yet the consistent inability of the perplexed [confused] enemy to respond effectively to this form of warfare indicated that Temujin [Genghis Khan] had introduced enough innovation to make these strategies uniquely his own. Temujin had produced a new type of steppe army based on a greater variety of tactics and, most important, close cooperation among the men and complete obedience to their commanders. They were no longer an attacking horde of individuals; they were now a united formation. Temujin used a set of manoeuvres that each man had to know and to which each responded precisely and without hesitation. The Mongols had a saying: "If he sends me into fire or water I go. I go for him." The saying reflected not just an ideal, but the reality of the new Mongol warfare, and it made short order of [rapidly defeated] the Naiman.

[Source: Excerpt(s) from GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD by Jack Weatherford,

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Compare and contrast what Sources B and C reveal about the factors that led to the success of Genghis Khan's military campaigns.

17N.1.BP.TZ0.04

Source A

Morris Rossabi, a professor of Chinese and Central Asian history, writing in a general history book, *The Mongols: A Very Short Introduction* (2012).

A fragile economy in a demanding environment and a Chinese dynasty's denial of trade for vital products are a few of the general conditions that gave rise to the Mongol eruption [expansion] from their homeland, but the specific motivations for the Mongol assault on the rest of the world are in doubt. Their military superiority is often used as an explanation for their emergence. The toughness of steppe life, according to some scholars, compelled the Mongols to be aggressive, and their aggressiveness spilled over [developed] into attacks on neighbouring states. Other scholars assert that the Mongols' hunger for booty [riches] inevitably caused them to raid and assault the settled civilizations. Their military advantages and circumstances certainly enabled them to succeed spectacularly in the 13th century, but they do not explain the motives for the Mongol migrations into other lands. They tell us how the Mongols conquered much of Asia, but not why.

[Source: Republished with permission of Oxford University Press, From *The Mongols: A Very Short Introduction*, Morris Rossabi, 2012; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.]

Source B

Peter Jackson, a professor of medieval history, writing in an academic book, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410* (2005).

The cohesiveness of the Mongol military stood in sharp contrast with the disunity of their enemies, which Genghis Khan and his successors took care to exploit. The political fragmentation of early 13th-century Rus' under the prolific Riurikid dynasty is well known. But division also characterized the two most formidable powers confronting the Mongols. Jurchen rule was deeply resented by the Khitan still living in the borderlands of China, large numbers of whom joined the Mongols or coordinated their own operations against the Chin [Jin] with those of Mongol commanders. Subsequently, even native Chinese and Jurchen officers and troops defected to the invaders. In western Asia, the Khwarazm shah's bitter quarrel with the 'Abbasid Caliph impaired [weakened] his capacity to pose as a champion of orthodoxy and the Jihad, while the unreliability of significant elements in his recently gained dominions undermined his preparations for resistance. By contrast, the religious tolerance that characterized Genghis Khan's empire also served the Mongols well, so that the Gur-khan's Muslim subjects in eastern Turkestan, who had been persecuted by Kuchlug, welcomed them as liberators.

[Source: From: *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410*, Peter Jackson, 2014,

Source C

Jack Weatherford, a professor of anthropology and a specialist in tribal peoples, writing in an academic book, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World* (2004).

[Mongol] tactics seemed to be, at least in part, a combination of older fighting techniques and hunting strategies; yet the consistent inability of the perplexed [confused] enemy to respond effectively to this form of warfare indicated that Temujin [Genghis Khan] had introduced enough innovation to make these strategies uniquely his own. Temujin had produced a new type of steppe army based on a greater variety of tactics and, most important, close cooperation among the men and complete obedience to their commanders. They were no longer an attacking horde of individuals; they were now a united formation. Temujin used a set of manoeuvres that each man had to know and to which each responded precisely and without hesitation. The Mongols had a saying: "If he sends me into fire or water I go. I go for him." The saying reflected not just an ideal, but the reality of the new Mongol warfare, and it made short order of [rapidly defeated] the Naiman.

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Aleksandr Yezhov, an artist of historical scenes, depicts a Mongol cavalry archer and Mongol archers in an illustration for the Russian military history magazine *Бойн* (Warrior) (2003).



[Source: "Mongol horse archers" by Giuseppe Rava; reproduced with the kind permission of the artist.]



Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree that Mongol military strength under Genghis Khan contributed to the Mongol takeover of Central Asia and the Near East?

22M.1.BP.TZ0.1

Source B An image depicting John and his brother Richard I, while their mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine, looks on, from the engraving *Prince John's Submission to Richard I* (1795).



[Source: After Benjamin West PRA *Prince John's Submission to Richard I*, 1795, Line engraving, 28.6 x 20.9 cm.

Photo credit: © Royal Academy of Arts, London.]

What does Source B suggest about Richard I and John?

22M.1.BP.TZ0.2

Source C William of Newburgh, a 12th century historian, writing in the chronicle *The History of English Affairs* (completed c1198).

John did not stop at this time from harassing his brother, and was a firm supporter of the king of France in all things. For while the king of France was devastating the Norman

territory, John was disturbing the provinces of England with troops of criminals. But the nobles of the kingdom, firm in faith, and unbroken in spirit, gathered an impressive body of soldiers. They opposed the lawless attempts of this mad-headed youth [John]. Besieging the castle of Windsor, which had fallen under John's power, they compelled it to surrender. But when John saw his supporters, whom he could not assist, exposed to the dangers of a siege, he requested a treaty for their safety, and gave up the castle.

[Source: The Internet Medieval Sourcebook, *William of Newburgh: Book Four*, Available at: <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/williamofnewburgh-four.asp#34> [Accessed 09 March 2021]. Source adapted.]

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source C for an historian studying the political impact in England of Richard I's absence.

22M.1.BP.TZ0.4

Source B An image depicting John and his brother Richard I, while their mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine, looks on, from the engraving *Prince John's Submission to Richard I* (1795).



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[Source: The Internet Medieval Sourcebook, *William of Newburgh: Book Four*, Available at: <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/williamofnewburgh-four.asp#34> [Accessed 09 March 2021]. Source adapted.]

Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the political impact of Richard I's absence in England.

21N.1.BP.TZ0.1


Source A Paul Lococo Jr, an historian specializing in Chinese military history, writing in the academic book *Genghis Khan: History's Greatest Empire Builder* (2008).

As we have seen already, alliances on the steppes were almost always fragile, as leaders wanted to gain benefits for themselves and their clans, as well as protection from other Mongol alliances. Over the years, Chinggis [Genghis Khan] demonstrated military and political skill, and he also acquired a reputation as a fair judge. His image was greatly enhanced through the use of shamans [spiritual leaders] who spread tales of omens favourable to Chinggis. The tribes often conducted successful raids, and Chinggis changed the way in which the rewards of the raids were divided. Traditionally, the various tribe and clan leaders divided the goods they had taken. Chinggis required that all plunder be placed in a common pile, and he then distributed it between the leaders, who in turn rewarded their followers. In this way, Chinggis not only created a better means of dividing the rewards of war, but he also emphasized his own supreme leadership. All rewards were granted by Chinggis, thus reinforcing his role as leader and his direct connection with the common Mongol soldier.

[Source: Adapted from *Genghis Khan: History's Greatest Empire Builder* by Paul Lococo, Jr, by permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 2008 by Paul Lococo, Jr. Published by Potomac Books, Inc.]

Source D

A map depicting the military campaigns of Genghis Khan.



[Source: Bkkbrad, 2019. Map of the Campaigns of Genghis Khan. [image online] Available at: <https://www.ancient.eu/image/11221/map-of-the-campaigns-of-genghis-khan/> Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/> [Accessed 11 December 2020]. Adapted.]

- Why, according to Source A, was Genghis Khan a successful leader? [3]
-

What does Source D suggest about the military campaigns under the leadership of Genghis Khan?

[2]

21N.1.BP.TZ0.2

Source C Marco Polo, an Italian merchant and explorer, recounting his travels to Asia between 1271–1295 in the 13th-century work *The Description of the World*.

In the year 1187, the Mongols made a king called Chinggis Khan. He was a man of great bravery, great intelligence, and great ability. This Chinggis Khan held the lordship nobly and well. Such a multitude of Mongols came to him; and when Chinggis Khan saw that he had so many people, he equipped them with bows and armor and went conquering through those other lands. They conquered eight provinces but did them no harm, nor did he strip them of their things. But he took them with him to conquer other peoples. In

this way, he conquered this great multitude of peoples, as you have heard. When these peoples saw this lord's good lordship and great nobility, they went with him quite willingly. When Chinggis Khan had amassed such a great multitude of people, he said that he wanted to conquer a great part of the world.

[Source: Polo, M., 2016. *The Description of the World*. Translated by S. Kinoshita. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, p. 52. Adapted.]

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source C for an historian studying the leadership of Genghis Khan.

21N.1.BP.TZ0.3

Source A Paul Lococo Jr, an historian specializing in Chinese military history, writing in the academic book *Genghis Khan: History's Greatest Empire Builder* (2008).

As we have seen already, alliances on the steppes were almost always fragile, as leaders wanted to gain benefits for themselves and their clans, as well as protection from other Mongol alliances. Over the years, Chinggis [Genghis Khan] demonstrated military and political skill, and he also acquired a reputation as a fair judge. His image was greatly enhanced through the use of shamans [spiritual leaders] who spread tales of omens favourable to Chinggis. The tribes often conducted successful raids, and Chinggis changed the way in which the rewards of the raids were divided. Traditionally, the various tribe and clan leaders divided the goods they had taken. Chinggis required that all plunder be placed in a common pile, and he then distributed it between the leaders, who in turn rewarded their followers. In this way, Chinggis not only created a better means of dividing the rewards of war, but he also emphasized his own supreme leadership. All rewards were granted by Chinggis, thus reinforcing his role as leader and his direct connection with the common Mongol soldier.

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Source B George Lane, a professor of the history of the Middle East and Central Asia, writing in the academic book *Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule* (2004).

As head of the tribe, the chief was concerned mainly with the allocation of pastures, the planning of migration times and routes, and decisive leadership. The shaman and the other nobles, effectively a tribal council, both confirmed and provided limits to the chief's authority. The tribe operated on two administrative levels. At the higher level was the tribal chief, who had direct control over the tribal nobles. At the lower level, these individual nobles controlled their own followers. It was sometimes in the tribe's interest to form alliances or to seek the protection of a stronger tribe ...

As a chief, Chinggis Khan built his power base and his tribal empire through battle, and with each victory he added more men to his army and more people to his following. However, those independent-minded tribal chiefs remained with him not from fear but from choice. Chinggis Khan offered his followers rewards and plenty of plunder. The tribes responded to his call and surrendered their independence because they believed

that they would gain and prosper in his service. If he had not delivered, his support would have soon dissolved. Both his authority and the tribes' continued support depended on his victories and political and military success. The charisma of the leader was crucial.

[Source: Lane, G., 2004. *Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule*. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 5–6. Adapted.]

Compare and contrast what Sources A and B reveal about the leadership of Genghis Khan.

21N.1.BP.TZ0.4

Source A Paul Lococo Jr, an historian specializing in Chinese military history, writing in the academic book *Genghis Khan: History's Greatest Empire Builder* (2008).

As we have seen already, alliances on the steppes were almost always fragile, as leaders wanted to gain benefits for themselves and their clans, as well as protection from other Mongol alliances. Over the years, Chinggis [Genghis Khan] demonstrated military and political skill, and he also acquired a reputation as a fair judge. His image was greatly enhanced through the use of shamans [spiritual leaders] who spread tales of omens favourable to Chinggis. The tribes often conducted successful raids, and Chinggis changed the way in which the rewards of the raids were divided. Traditionally, the various tribe and clan leaders divided the goods they had taken. Chinggis required that all plunder be placed in a common pile, and he then distributed it between the leaders, who in turn rewarded their followers. In this way, Chinggis not only created a better means of dividing the rewards of war, but he also emphasized his own supreme leadership. All rewards were granted by Chinggis, thus reinforcing his role as leader and his direct connection with the common Mongol soldier.

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
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"Chinggis [Genghis] Khan built his power base and his tribal empire through battle" (Source B). Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with this statement?

[Source: Lane, G., 2004. *Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule*. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 5–6. Adapted.]