AS

PHILOSOPHY

7171

Paper 1 Epistemology and Moral Philosophy

Mark scheme

June 2019

Version 1.0 Final

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 2 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 15 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A - Epistemology

0 1   What is global scepticism?

[2 marks]

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Global scepticism is the claim that: (accept any of the following or similar):
- we cannot know anything (to be true or false)
- epistemological doubt can be extended without limit
- all of our knowledge claims are false
- none of our beliefs are sufficiently justified to count as knowledge.

Notes:

- Students might contrast global scepticism with local scepticism, although this is not a requirement. Credit can be given as long as students use this approach to clarify the nature of global scepticism.
- If students say global scepticism is scepticism about knowledge of anything outside the mind this is acceptable for full marks.
- Students must make reference to the epistemological nature of global scepticism in their answers. Answers that only mention ontological considerations without any of the epistemological dimensions are not credit worthy.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

| 0 | 2 | Explain Leibniz's argument for innatism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Innate knowledge is knowledge that is in some way present in the mind 'from birth' (or is present in a mind during the whole time that that mind has existed).
- Leibniz's argument:

    P1   Truths are either necessary (those that have to be true or are true in all possible worlds, e.g. '3+3=6') or contingent (those that do not have to be true or are true in some but not all possible worlds, e.g. 'the exam is three hours long'.)
    P2   We have knowledge of some necessary truths.
    P3   Sense experience only provides us with information about particular instances.
    P4   Necessary truths 'go beyond' particular instances - 'however many instances confirm a general truth, they aren't enough to establish its universal necessity'.
    (To respond that necessary truths are generalisations from experience of particular instances is to allow the possibility of the contrary of a necessary truth – which is inconceivable)
    C1:   Necessary truths cannot be known through sense experience.
    C2:   Therefore, necessary truths must be in some sense always present in the mind, which is to say innate. (There must be an "active disposition to draw them from its own depths")

- Students may also point out that, for Leibniz, experience is necessary to trigger consciousness of innately known truths (but does not provide the justification of them and is therefore not sufficient for innate knowledge).
- Students may refer to Leibniz's marble block analogy to illustrate the point above.
- If students explain Leibniz' argument for innatism based on intellectual ideas/concepts, this should be credited accordingly.

Note:
- Students do not have to lay the argument out as above, but the key steps must be made explicit.
- Answers that only outline innatism without any reference to Leibniz' argument can gain a maximum 1 mark.

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 3   Outline direct realism and explain how the time-lag argument challenges this view.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Direct realism: Direct realism is a theory of perception that makes two key claims: (a) an external world of mind-independent objects and properties exists and (b) we perceive it directly. E.g.:

- The immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties (spec)
- We directly perceive mind-independent physical objects in the external world
- There are no 'intermediaries' (e.g. sense-data) which we directly perceive or are directly aware of and in virtue of which we perceive a mind independent world indirectly.
- Accept comparisons with other theories of perception (e.g. idealism and indirect realism) as long as they serve the question.

The time-lag argument:

- Students may present the time-lag argument in relation to any of our senses. The most common forms of the argument focus on sight and hearing.

> P1   It takes time for light to reach our eyes from the object we are perceiving (eg it takes 8 minutes for the light from the sun to reach us and 1.3 seconds for the light from the moon to reach us).
>
> P2   During that time the object (a) may have changed or (b) ceased to exist.
>
> C1   Therefore, the object of my immediate experience is distinct from the aforementioned object because (a) it may have different properties or (b) because you can't perceive something that doesn't exist.
>
> C3   Therefore, the immediate object of our visual experience is not identical to the object being seen (the "ordinary object of perception").
>
> C4   Therefore, direct realism is false.

Note:
- Answers that give detailed accounts of direct realism without reference to the time lag argument can be given a maximum 4 marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 4 Explain Descartes' proof of the external world from the existence of God.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

This is an example of one of Descartes' a priori deductions. Students may therefore explain what it means for an argument to be a priori and a deduction:
1) Deduction: an argument is a deduction if the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.
2) A priori: an argument is a priori when all the premises are knowable a priori (ie independently of experience).

Students may explain one or more of Descartes' arguments for the existence of God. Whilst this is not the specific focus of the question, it should not be considered as redundancy.

Descartes' argument can be reconstructed in the following way:

P1   I have perceptual experiences as if of physical objects, which must have a cause outside of me.

P2   This cause must be either my own mind, God, or external physical objects.

P3   If the cause were my own mind, those perceptual experiences would be voluntary/under my control.

P4   However, they are not voluntary/under my control.

P5   If the cause were God, then those perceptual experiences would be deceptive (given that I have a very strong tendency to believe that physical objects exist).

P6   However, they cannot be deceptive as God exists and is not a deceiver.

C1   Therefore, those perceptual experiences must be caused by external physical objects.

C2   Therefore, there is an external world of physical objects.

Note:
- Students do not have to lay the argument out as above, but the key steps must be made explicit; that I have experiences that I cannot control and these must be experiences of an external world, as they seem to be, if God is not a deceiver.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 5   Is knowledge justified true belief?

[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13–15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct, and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used consistently and correctly throughout.
10–12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
7–9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always correctly.
4–6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences. There is some limited use of philosophical language.

1–3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument.
	Philosophical terms might be mentioned.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Conclusions may include:
  - YES: knowledge is justified true belief (JTB).
  - YES…but: knowledge is JTB with minor modifications of what is understood by one or more of the three conditions (for example, by arguing that the justification condition needs to be strengthened, e.g. infallibilism).
  - NO: knowledge is not JTB because the conditions need to be added to or replaced.
  - NO: knowledge is not JTB because one or more of the conditions are not necessary.
  - NO: knowledge is not JTB because knowledge is unanalysable and explanatorily fundamental and basic (students may support this claim by arguing that there will always be a Gettier-type counter-example for every analysis of knowledge).

- This question relates to the definition of propositional knowledge (knowing 'that') – which may be distinguished from acquaintance knowledge (knowing 'of') and ability knowledge (knowing 'how').

- The subject of the question is the tripartite view (the 'traditional' view, the Platonic view, JTB theory) that S knows that p if and only if (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p. These conditions are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

The following issues relating to the JTB theory of knowledge may be discussed to support one of the positions above.
- Issue: the conditions are not individually necessary.
  - Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge (e.g. "I know but I don't know how/why I know").
  - Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge (through scepticism about truth).
  - Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge ("she knows that p but doesn't believe that p": e.g. a series of reliably good answers in a quiz that S would characterise as guesses).

- Issue: the conditions are not jointly sufficient.
  - Cases of lucky true beliefs show that the justification condition should be either strengthened, added to or replaced (i.e. Gettier-style counter-examples: inferential cases (e.g. Gettier's Smith/Jones interview or car/location examples) and/or non-inferential cases (e.g. the 'barn façade' example)).
    - Responses to this include:

    - strengthen the justification condition so that it implies truth: infallibilism and the requirement for an impossibility of doubt (Descartes).
      - Arguments for infallibilism, such as the possibility that they avoid Gettier-style problems and the (intuitive) link between knowledge and certainty/not being able to be wrong.
      - Arguments against infallibilism, such as the possibility that it goes too far and we could end up able to make almost no knowledge claims, leading to scepticism.

    - add a 'no false lemmas' condition (J+T+B+N) : adding a requirement to JTB that you do not infer your belief from anything false.
      - Arguments for JTB with no false lemmas, such as that it deals with Gettier's examples.
      - Arguments against JTB with no false lemmas, such as the possibility of constructing examples of JTB with no false lemmas which do not count as knowledge and the possibility of examples of knowledge where there are false lemmas.

- o replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (reliabilism) – may be linked to externalism.
  - Arguments for reliabilism, such as it being implausible to claim that we need justification for all knowledge claims, or that our knowledge claims do need to be based on absolute certainty; it allows children/animals/those incapable of reasoning to have some knowledge.
  - Arguments against reliabilism, such as the difficulty in formulating a clear notion of 'reliable', the problem of individuating methods, and the necessity of an internalist concept of justification.
  - Add a 'truth tracking' condition (Nozick) or a causal condition (Goldman).

- o replace 'justified' with an account of epistemic virtue (V+T+B).
  - Arguments for virtue epistemology, such as their success in dealing with Gettier's examples, because the beliefs there are true because of luck/coincidence, rather than intellectual virtue.
  - Arguments against virtue epistemology, such as the possibility of constructing cases of beliefs which are true because of intellectual virtue, but those not counting as knowledge.

Notes:

- As the focus of this question is primarily AO2, do not penalise students for misattributing arguments.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Moral philosophy

0 6   What does Aristotle mean by a 'voluntary action'?

[2 marks]

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
2 AO1	2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
	1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Aristotle defines a voluntary action as one that meets two necessary conditions (i.e., both conditions must be met for it to count as voluntary).

1) It is the person that knowingly/willingly causes the action (i.e., it is not done under compulsion/force or ignorance; sometimes referred to as the 'control' condition) – "*the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him.*"
2) The person is aware of the relevant non-moral facts (i.e. the moral agent knows the relevant properties of their action; sometimes referred to as the 'epistemic' condition) – he lacks *"ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned."*

Note:
- For 2 marks, reference to both necessary conditions must be made.
- Answers that make reference to only one condition can gain a maximum 1 mark.
- Answers that do not make clear reference to either condition are not worthy of credit.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 7   Explain Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Aristotle uses his doctrine of the mean to explain what (the) virtues are and what is involved in living virtuously.
- Students might explain that the virtues of something are those characteristics that enable it to perform its function well and so, in us, they are those intellectual/moral qualities that enable us to achieve eudaimonia: a life of reason (in accordance with virtue).
- *Moral* virtues involve both "passion and action" and hence it is matter of both feeling and acting appropriately about certain situations/events.
- Virtue is a mean between two extremes, excess and deficiency: when we choose (or feel) appropriately/virtuously then we are avoiding vices of excess and deficiency.
- He claims that a virtue can be understood as "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in the mean, ie the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the person of practical wisdom would determine it".

- Given that he says that the mean is "relative to us" this implies that it may be different for different people.
- It will also be relative to the circumstances: we are "to feel [passions] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way".
- This means that Aristotle does not see the appropriate response as always being the luke-warm/moderate response – it can be appropriate at times to be very angry, for example.
- Aristotle gives many examples and students are likely to use at least one of these to illustrate Aristotle's ideas.

Here is his list:

	Vice of deficiency	Virtue	Vice of excess
Fear	Cowardly	Courageous	Rash
Pleasure/pain	'Insensible'	Temperate	Self-indulgent
Giving/taking money	Mean	Liberal ('free')	Prodigal ('spendthrift')
Spending large sums of money	Niggardly	'Magnificent'	Tasteless
Important honour	Unduly humble	Properly proud	Vain
Small honours	'Unambitious'	'Properly ambitious'	'Overambitious'
Anger	'Unirascible'	Good-tempered	Short-tempered
Truthfulness (regarding oneself)	Falsely modest	Truthful	Boastful
Humour	Boorish	Witty	Buffoonish
Pleasant to others	Quarrelsome, surly	Friendly	Obsequious
Shame	Shy	Modest	Shameless
Attitude to others' fortune	Spiteful	Righteously indignant	Envious

- Students may make the following additional points:
  - Aristotle notes that some actions are wrong without this meaning that they involve excess or deficiency, e.g. murder and adultery
  - Aristotle's ethics is seen by many as being uncodifiable in the sense that I cannot be captured in one or more strict rules. Aristotle clearly states that ethics lacks the precision that is available in other disciplines. This means that ethical progress/learning is a matter of experience, reflection, habituation and paying attention to virtuous role-models, rather than a matter of grasping a rule.

Note:
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 8   Outline Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative <u>and</u> explain the issue that not all non-universalisable maxims are immoral.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Outline Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative…

The core content is as follows (as an outline):
- Kant's first formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Formula of Universal Law) is: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [or "universal law of nature"]" (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals):
  - acting on a maxim which does not pass the test is morally wrong
  - a maxim fails the test of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised
  - students may give one or more examples to explain this, e.g. lying / false promises (see below for more detail on this).

Students may also add the following details:

- an imperative is a statement commanding a course of action/choice to agents; a statement about what one ought to do or must do
- categorical imperatives apply to all rational agents regardless of any ends/goals they have chosen – they command "an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end" – ie "Do X"
- Kant uses the term 'maxims' to refer to the intentions that guide us in choosing our actions. This means that every time we act, we act according to a maxim (and even if we never get to carry out our intended action, there will always have been a maxim that we had in mind when we intended to perform that action). A maxim is always phrased in the following format: 'I will A in C in order to realize or produce E' where 'A' is some act type, 'C' is some type of circumstance/conditions, and 'E' is some type of end/purpose to be realized or achieved by A in C
- if it would be impossible to conceive of everyone acting on a maxim this may be referred to as a 'contradiction in conception' and leads to a "perfect duty" not to act on the maxim
  - for example, take the maxim 'I will make a false promise, if it gets me what I want.' If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say, 'All rational agents must, by a universal law of nature, make false promises when it gets them what they want.' Promises presupposes people taking you at your word, but, in this world, the practice of promise-keeping doesn't exist. So my maxim cannot exist with itself as a universal law. Thus, we have a (perfect) duty not to make false promises
- if a maxim does not lead to a contradiction in conception but nonetheless leads to a 'contradiction in the will', then we have an imperfect duty not to act on the maxim
  - for example, take the maxim 'I will refuse to help others who are in need'. If you universalise this then this would conflict with something that you will, namely that others help you on certain occasions. Thus we have an imperfect duty to help others. It is imperfect because we need to carry this out at least to some extent. To put the duty as a double negative: we must not never help others.

…**and explain the issue that not all non-universalisable maxims are immoral.**

- The issue here is that there are maxims that cannot be consistently universalised (ie it would be impossible for everyone to act on them), and yet these maxims (or the actions that they recommend) seem either at best morally permissible and at worst morally good.
- Whichever example/s the student chooses, they need to:
  - explain why it is that it cannot be consistently universalised
  - and make some attempt to explain why (intuitively) it is not immoral.
- Here are some examples that students might use, though it is hard to predict cases and examiners will need to use their judgement:
  - I'll buy clockwork trains and never sell them – *if everyone never sold them you couldn't fulfil your intention of buying them (and nor could anyone)*
  - I will let others go through doors before me – *if everyone tried to let others through first then you couldn't fulfil your intention of letting others through before you (and nor could anyone)*
  - I will turn up early to avoid the queue - *if everyone turned up (equally) early then you couldn't fulfil your intention of avoiding a queue (and nor could anyone)*
  - I will give a larger percentage of my income to charity (at time t1) than the average person does (as calculated at time t1) – *It is impossible for everyone to give more (or less) than the average (though everyone could give the same as the average if they all gave the same amount).*

Note:
- Answers that give detailed accounts of Kant's first formulation without reference to the issue can be given a maximum 4 marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 9 Outline rule utilitarianism <u>and</u> explain how rule-utilitarians might oppose the telling of lies.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Outline rule utilitarianism…

Rule utilitarians claim that an act is morally right if [we can reasonably expect / predict that] it is in accordance with a rule that is a member of a set of rules that, if accepted by everyone, maximise utility (in comparison with other possible alternatives).
A rule utilitarian would make a moral decision by the following procedure:
- ahead of the act, determine the (utility-maximising) rules
- then, when considering whether to perform an act, or which act to perform, the agent should:
  o identify which rule is relevant to the act – which rule the act would fall under
  o act according to that rule.

Some students might compare this approach to act utilitarianism, where on each occasion ("case by case") the consequences of each act are considered in order to make a decision. This will mean that one "type" of action might on one occasion be the right action and on another not be.

<u>and</u> explain how rule-utilitarians might oppose the telling of lies.

- In deciding whether to adopt the rule "Do not (ever) tell lies", the rule-utilitarian would need to consider what the consequences would be if this was accepted by everyone.

- Students should therefore discuss ways in which lying decreases utility and/or ways in which not lying increases utility. There are many ways in which this could be done, but here are some examples:
  - lying will likely lead to a breakdown in trust between individuals which will have implications for the quality of relationships between people and will impact on social practices. This is likely to decrease utility
  - if people lie too often to others they may start to lose track of the truth themselves which will have implications for them
  - Mill argues that "the truth of an opinion is part of its utility", presumably given that true beliefs (or, at least, beliefs that reliably track differences in the world) are required for us to better negotiate the world and achieve our aims
  - truth is required for progress, including scientific progress
  - lies tend to be uncovered at a later date, and this may make the disutility at that point greater than the disutility of telling the truth now.

Some students might make the distinction between strong and weak rule utilitarianism, explaining how weak rule utilitarians could make exceptions to the general rule "Do not lie" in extreme situations, if this would lead to an overall increase in utility.

Note:
- Answers that give detailed accounts of rule utilitarianism without reference to how rule utilitarians might oppose the telling of lies can be given a maximum 4 marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

1 0   Is moral realism the right approach to metaethics?

[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13-15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used consistently and correctly throughout.
10-12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
7-9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always correctly.
4-6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.

	There is some limited use of philosophical language.
1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument. Philosophical terms might be mentioned.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Moral realism can be expressed in various ways. Here are some acceptable examples:
- there are mind-independent moral properties/facts (AQA Specification)
- moral language is truth apt and can be used to make true claims that affirm the existence of mind-independent moral properties
- moral judgements are made true or false by objective moral properties that are mind independent.

There are many theories that might be considered to be versions of moral realism, and it is possible that students might give them as examples:
- moral realism includes naturalist realist views (e.g. some versions of utilitarianism and virtue ethics) and non-naturalist views (e.g. intuitionism, divine command theory (arguably), Platonism)
- there may also be versions of moral realism that relate to contractarian views
- **NB:** There is widespread debate about how best to characterise the distinction between realism and anti-realism about X, and ethics is no exception. It is important that the student is clear about their approach and is clear about their understanding of realism.

Conclusions may be drawn from the following:

YES: it is the right account of metaethics – i.e. the student may support and/or defend the account.
- This may be done by, in the end, supporting/defending a particular version (or some versions) of moral realism…
- …or by defending it in general but with particular versions being employed as **examples** of how moral realists might fill out their account…
- …or by defending it in general with no reference to any particular versions of morel realism.

NO: it is not the right account of metaethics – i.e. the student may argue that it cannot be adequately supported and/or that there are (fatal) issues with the account
- This may be done by arguing that prominent versions of moral realism fail to adequately respond to issues…
- …and/or by arguing that a particular version of moral anti-realism succeeds (either a cognitivist version (eg error theory) or a non-cognitivist version (e.g. emotivism)…
- …or by arguing that there are general issues that cannot (in general) be responded to by moral realists.

Arguments against moral realism:

- Mackie's argument from relativity: widespread and intractable moral disagreement (and a lack of a procedure by which we can resolve it) is best explained by the falsity of moral realism (and therefore moral realism is (probably) false)
  - in response one might argue that:
    - there is more agreement than Mackie implies
    - the disagreement is about the non-moral facts rather than the moral facts
    - there is disagreement in other areas that we may be realists about (e.g. scientific disagreement)

- ▪ that disagreement <u>can</u> be explained by people having inferior access to mind-independent moral properties

- Mackie's argument/s from queerness: mind-independent moral properties, if they existed, would be metaphysically "queer" (and knowledge of them would therefore require such an epistemologically "queer" faculty) - i.e. they would be completely different to any other property that we have reason to believe exist – and so it is implausible that they exist (and so implausible that moral realism is true)
  - o in response one might argue that:
    - ▪ this would also support a non-naturalist realist position
    - ▪ this would also support the view that there must be natural moral properties of a "queer" sort that cannot be reduced to non-moral natural properties (i.e. non-reductive moral naturalism)
    - ▪ there are other properties that have similar characteristics, e.g. painfulness / pleasureableness.

- Hume's Fork: moral propositions are neither relations of ideas nor matters of fact, therefore moral knowledge is impossible (and so moral realism is false)
- A J Ayer's verification principle: moral sentences are neither analytically true (or false) nor can they be verified by experience, therefore they are not cognitively meaningful (and so moral realism, a cognitivist view, is false)
- Hume's is-ought gap: propositions about morality ("ought" statements) cannot be legitimately deduced from propositions about what is the case ("is" statements) (and so moral realism, is false, assuming that propositions about facts/properties are all "is" statements)
- Hume's argument that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us (arguably) opposes cognitivism (and so opposes any cognitivist forms of moral realism)
  - o in response, one could be an externalist about moral motivation.

<u>Arguments supporting moral realism:</u>

- Moral realism is the best explanation of the ways in which we use moral language, including moral reasoning, persuading, disagreeing etc. – i.e. it is unlikely that such widespread commitments and practices would exist if there were no truth to moral claims (e.g. when people disagree it is because they think there are facts that would settle the disagreement).
- Moral anti-realism is committed to the implausible claim that there can be no such thing as moral progress (e.g. that it is not better if there is less prejudice against women (as is the case in many, but not all, countries)).
- One might argue (pace Mackie) that there is agreement about moral claims and that this counts in favour of moral realism: very many common basic moral principles across societies.
- Phenomenology: one might argue that we perceive that acts (e.g. torture) are wrong.

Note:
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.