# A-LEVEL
# **PHILOSOPHY**
# **7172/1**

Paper 1 Epistemology and moral philosophy

Mark scheme

June 2019

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

# Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

## Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.
When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

## Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

## Guidance
You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

**Section A – Epistemology**

| 0 | 1 | Define (a) acquaintance knowledge, (b) ability knowledge, and (c) propositional knowledge.

**[3 marks]**

AO1 = 3

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|---|---|
| 3 | A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy. |
| 2 | The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision. |
| 1 | Relevant, but fragmented, points. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

• Acquaintance knowledge: having acquaintance knowledge is…
- …knowing / having knowledge of X (by experience of X)
- …knowing / having knowledge of X (a place/thing/person) by experience of X (it/him/her)
- … knowing of'
- e.g. I know Jim well; I know York (like the back of my hand).

• Ability knowledge: having ability knowledge is…
- …knowing / having knowledge of how to perform/complete a task/action
- …having the ability to perform/complete/carry out a task/action
- … knowing 'how'…
- e.g. I know how to ride a bike; I know how to tie my shoelaces.

• Propositional knowledge: having propositional knowledge is….
- …knowing / having knowledge that some claim – a proposition – is true or false
- …knowing / having knowledge that p (where p is a proposition)
- …knowing / having knowledge that something is the case
- …having knowledge that is expressed in the form of a true proposition/sentence/assertion.
- …knowing / having knowledge of a fact/truth
- …Knowing 'that'…
- e.g. I know that 2 + 2 = 4; I know that the sky is blue
- (Students might give a definition of a proposition (eg a declarative sentence) but need not do so)
- Do not credit knowing 'about' something, as this does not sufficiently distinguish propositional from acquaintance knowledge.

Students might give an example for one or more of these but need not do so. Assign one mark for a correct definition of each type of knowledge. If the example is accurate but the definition is not, do not award a mark. E.g. "Acquaintance knowledge is knowledge about the world e.g. I know Steve". Gets 0 marks. Students may embed the definition in the example, which is fine. If a student response contains no credit-worthy definitions but one or more correct example is present, credit a maximum of 1 mark for fragmented relevant material assuming that what the student has written is correct. E.g. "I have acquaintance knowledge about Australia because I visited there last year".

**Note:**
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

| 0 | 2 | Explain Berkeley's 'Master' argument.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|-------------------------------|
| 5 | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy. |
| 4 | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy. |
| 3 | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2 | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear. |
| 1 | Fragmented points, with no logical structure. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

- The 'Master' argument is an argument in favour of idealism, the position that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (collections of ideas), and that all that exists are minds or mind-dependent objects. Students may link the master argument to anti-realism more generally, and this would be credit-worthy.
- It is therefore an argument against perceptual realism (the claim that there are objects which exist mind-independently).
- The 'Master' argument suggests that it is a contradiction to claim that we can conceive of a mind-independent object (i.e. it is impossible to conceive of a mind-independent object). The reason for this is that if one conceives of an object, then that object depends on one's mind.

Students might use specific examples from the anthology text:
- e.g. Philonous argues that if Hylas conceives of 'a tree or house existing by itself, independently of and unperceived by any mind,' then Hylas is conceiving of them and they are therefore dependent on the perceiving mind of Hylas
- '[T]o conceive of the unperceived' is therefore a contradiction analogous to 'seeing an unseen thing'
- Hylas admits that he has made 'an amusing mistake. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place with nobody there to see it, I thought that was conceiving a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of, overlooking the fact I myself conceived it all the while.'

**Note:**
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

| 0 | 3 |  Explain Descartes' cogito as an example of an a priori intuition.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|---|---|
| 5 | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy. |
| 4 | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy. |
| 3 | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2 | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear. |
| 1 | Fragmented points, with no logical structure. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

The focus of this question is the cogito. Students who only address this part of the question but say nothing about a priori intuition can score a maximum of 3 marks. However, if students only discuss a priori intuition but not the cogito, they can score a maximum of 2 marks.

Descartes' cogito:
- The cogito is Descartes' claim that he exists (one's claim that one exists): "I am, I exist"
- In the cogito Descartes here understands himself as a thinking thing that is clear and distinct (and is therefore not necessarily identical to his body)
- Even if an evil demon is deceiving him about the existence of physical objects (res extensa) and thereby knowledge of the external world/empirical knowledge/knowledge that is justified empirically /synthetic a posteriori knowledge - along with knowledge of mathematical truths (a priori knowledge) - the evil demon cannot deceive him about his own existence since, if the evil demon is deceiving him, he must exist to be deceived
    - "But there is a supremely powerful and cunning deceiver who deliberately deceives me all the time! Even then, if he is deceiving me I undoubtedly exist: let him deceive me all he can, he will never bring it about that *I am nothing* while *I think I am something*."
    - "I conclude that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, must be true whenever I assert it or think it." (The popular Latin phrase 'cogito ergo sum,' is a translation of the original 'je pense, donc je suis' which Descartes wrote down in his 'Discourse on Method. The phrase does not appear in the anthology text. Students, however, should not be penalised if they don't know this)
- It is a true belief that is indubitable / immune to doubt / certain and therefore counts as knowledge.

It is an a priori intuition:
- It is not known through sense experience / empirical observation
- It is a direct or non-inferential awareness of a truth which has been discovered by thinking and reasoning alone
- some students might distinguish intuition from deduction/s, where the deduced claim is inferred from other claims. Students could go further and explore why the cogito is an example of intuition rather than deduction
- It is therefore a foundational piece of knowledge (some students might link this to Descartes' rational foundationalism)
- Students might refer to the 'cogito' as a 'clear and distinct idea' and go on to define 'clear and distinct' in accordance with the definition given in Descartes' Principles of Philosophy:
    - To be clear an idea must be 'open and present to the attending mind.'
    - To be distinct it must not only be clear but precise and separated from other ideas so that it

'plainly contains in itself nothing other than what is clear.'
- Clear and distinct ideas may be understood as 'principles of natural light', 'self-evident propositions', 'eternal truths', or 'axioms'
- Some students might mention that this is arguably an example of synthetic a priori knowledge, given that claims about the actual existence of something are synthetic.

| 0 | 4 | Outline how indirect realism leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects **and** explain Locke's response based on the involuntary nature of our experience. |

**[12 marks]**

AO1 = 12

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|--------------------------------|
| 10–12 | The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 7–9 | The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 4–6 | The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response. |
| 1–3 | There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

Outline how indirect realism leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects…

Indirect realism is the claim that:
- mind-independent/physical objects exist in the external world
- but we never directly perceive them
- instead we only ever perceive them indirectly by directly perceiving or being aware of mind-dependent entities (such as sense-data, ideas, impressions).

The issue of scepticism facing indirect realism:
- If we never directly perceive mind-independent/physical objects, our perceptual experiences can never give us direct evidence that such objects exist
- Any claim that mind-independent objects exist would therefore have to be inferred from claims about our sense-data (ideas, impressions)
- Such an inference cannot be justified
    - Neither experience (a posteriori argument) nor reason (a priori argument) can justify such an inference. (Some students will focus mainly or solely on experience being unable to justify such an inference, without mentioning 'reason' and this is fine)
- **Therefore, the indirect realist cannot know that there is any mind-independent/external reality beyond what is directly perceived (i.e. mind-dependent sense data)**

In addition to explaining the issue for indirect realism relating to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects, students might go on to refer to sceptical argument more generally. Examples include but are not limited to:

- Descartes' waves of doubt (though the evil demon argument is the most obviously relevant to the existence of the external world)
- Berkeley's argument that so-called primary qualities (reality) are as mind-dependent as so-called secondary qualities, and that therefore we cannot know by the qualities we perceive that a mind-dependent reality exists
- Arguments that support the claim that we are only ever directly aware of mind-dependent objects (sense-data): e.g. the argument from perceptual variation, the argument from illusion, the argument from hallucination, and the time-lag argument
- Humean arguments: neither reason nor experience can establish real causal relations
- Students may refer to sceptical scenarios in popular culture to explain the issue of scepticism which faces indirect realism, e.g. films such as 'The Matrix' or 'Inception'
- Students may also argue against Descartes' attempt to argue a priori from the nature of experience and the nature of God to the possibility of veridical perception

None of these additional developments are required, but they should not be classed as redundant / penalised so long as they do not detract from the quality of the response. However, it is important that the specific problem for indirect realism is explained (see previous page), and that students do not simply provide an explanation of scepticism / sceptical arguments more generally.


**…and** explain Locke's response based on the involuntary nature of our experience.

- Locke argues that our sensations must be caused by something outside of ourselves:
    - "I find that I can't avoid having those ideas produced in my mind."
- The fact that our experiences are involuntary suggests that they must come from outside of ourselves, and are most likely caused by mind-independent physical objects, since the ideas that are mind-dependent and stem from our own imagination are under our control and voluntary
- Locke gives the example that he can shut his eyes and choose to recall the idea of light but if he turns his eyes to the sky at noon he cannot 'avoid' the idea of light being produced in him
- Some students might identify this argument as being an inductive argument.


**Note:**
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

| 0 | 5 | Do we have innate knowledge? **[25 marks]**

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|--------------------------------|
|       |                                |
| 21–25 | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.<br>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.<br>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.<br>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.<br>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 16–20 | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.<br>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.<br>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.<br>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.<br>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.<br>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 11–15 | A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.<br>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.<br>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.<br>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.<br>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument. |
| 6–10  | The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.<br>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail.<br>Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.<br>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.<br>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently. |

| 1–5 | There is little evidence of an argument.<br>There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.<br>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.<br>There is some basic use of philosophical language. |
|---|---|
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

- The question of innate knowledge is exclusively a question of innate propositional knowledge. It is not a question of innate abilities (e.g. to breath or cry for food), although Locke's argument that we have an innate ability to gain propositional knowledge might be used to argue that it is superfluous/redundant to claim that we have innate knowledge.
- Students might clarify what innate knowledge is (e.g. knowledge not derived from/justified by empirical experiences but somehow **part of the structure of the mind from birth**). Expect students to suggest that innate knowledge might be unconscious/subconscious (Plato) or latent and not fully formed but 'sketched' or 'outlined' in the way in which the veins of a marble block outlines a statue (Leibniz).
- Students might identify the claim that we have innate knowledge with 'rationalism' as opposed to 'empiricism' – suggesting that rationalists, contrary to empiricists, deny that the mind is a tabula rasa. This fine (though not all rationalists are innatists)
- Students may consider innate knowledge in general or particular kinds of innate knowledge: eg knowledge of theological, moral, mathematical, or metaphysical truths.
- Many of the arguments relevant to this question relate to both innate knowledge and concepts. A discussion framed exclusively in terms of concepts (i.e. that fails to talk about knowledge at all) is a significant misunderstanding. However, if the discussion of relevant arguments is articulated with reference to innate concepts, and they relate this back to the issue of innate knowledge (either on an ongoing basis, or at key points in the response) this should not be penalised severely: an imprecision rather than error.

An important note on a priori knowledge vs. innate knowledge

In making the link to rationalism vs. empiricism, students must not confuse / conflate the possibility of a priori knowledge (gained independently of experience/not known through sense experience) with the possibility of innate knowledge (knowledge that is part of the structure of the mind from birth). Although innate knowledge could be one example of a priori knowledge, the possibility of a priori knowledge does not entail the possibility of innate knowledge.

If it is used at all, the debate between rationalists and empiricists on the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge (rationalism understood as the view that such knowledge is possible and empiricism understood as the view that all synthetic knowledge is a posteriori and all a priori knowledge is merely analytic) – Hume's fork) must be clearly related to the issue of innate knowledge.

Students might argue as below:

- YES: we do have innate knowledge.
- NO: we do not have innate knowledge.
    - Students might argue that since we have no innate ideas we cannot have any innate knowledge (given that having innate knowledge requires/entails having innate concepts but not vice versa).
    - Alternatively, they might argue that although we do not have innate knowledge there is nevertheless something innate to us (eg innate ideas).

- Students might suggest that we do not possess innate knowledge, but we do possess an inability to form certain kinds of knowledge.

Yes – we do have innate knowledge

- Plato's theory of recollection/anamnesis in the Meno. Our innate knowledge is unconscious/subconscious but a process of questions and answers will help a person recollect/remember what (s)he already knows.
- Students might argue that Plato thereby overcomes the paradox learning/inquiry and that learning/inquiry is only possible in so far as we possess innate knowledge.
- Other Platonic dialogues might be used to show that we have innate knowledge. e.g. Phaedo's argument from imperfection. Students can also refer to Plato's theory of Forms in general but should be careful and not forget to focus on innate knowledge.
- Leibniz: (referring back to Plato) Empirical experiences can only give us knowledge about particular and contingent truths. We have, however, knowledge about necessary and universal truths, which therefore must be innate to us.
- Leibniz (against Locke): We have innate knowledge of certain principles (such as 'whatever is, is' and 'the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time.' Even if our knowledge of these principles are not explicit/conscious but somehow implicit/subconscious/tacit, it still counts as (innate) knowledge. Leibniz suggests that knowledge of these principles are like "enthymemes" and rejects Locke's claim that innate knowledge must be conscious.

Possible other points:
- arguments to the best explanation – Innate knowledge best explains universal knowledge of, e.g. mathematical and moral truths.
- students may use examples drawn from people such as Kant.
- students may use examples of innate abilities (e.g. from Chomsky, Carruthers etc.).

No – we do not have innate knowledge

Plato's theory of recollection/the slave boy example in the Meno is not persuasive for a variety of reasons:

(1) it presupposes that we have an immortal soul
(2) Socrates is teaching the slave-boy who therefore isn't recollecting
(3) it merely shows that some knowledge is analytic rather than innate.

Leibniz's argument is not convincing. In so far as we have a priori knowledge of necessary truths, our knowledge is merely analytic or conceptual.

Locke's argument against innate knowledge: the argument from universal consent:

(1) if there is universal consent, it can be explained in terms of having the same innate abilities to gain knowledge empirically which is a better explanation than having to postulate innate knowledge and
(2) there isn't any universal consent (children and 'idiots').

- Locke's argument that it will not do to say that 'innate knowledge' can be subconscious because (1) subconscious knowledge is almost a contradiction in terms and (2) it would be impossible to distinguish innate knowledge from an innate potential to gain knowledge.
- Hume's copy-principle and arguments therefore (the challenge to think of any idea that has not been derived directly or indirectly from an experience – including the idea of God; the argument from the congenitally blind man).
- Hume's fork: all knowledge is of matters of fact or relations of ideas, where these ideas and therefore both types of knowledge are derived from experience (i.e. using Hume's fork to make the point that even if knowledge is a priori this does not mean that it is innate.
- Hume's argument that we could not have the knowledge which the innatist claims that we have eg our

knowledge of causality.
- Innate knowledge requires God/past life, which are not acceptable.
- Even if certain truths are somehow innately and actually encoded in the mind, this is a genetic issue, the fruit of which would be innate belief; innate knowledge requires justification or warrant which cannot be innate.

**Section B – Moral philosophy**

| 0 | 6 |    What is moral anti-realism?

**[3 marks]**

AO1 = 3

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|-------------------------------|
| 3 | A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy. |
| 2 | The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision. |
| 1 | Relevant, but fragmented, points. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content**

Examples for 3 marks:

- … the view that there are no mind-independent moral properties/facts
- … the view that there are no objective moral facts/properties
- … the view that moral properties/facts do exist but are mind-dependent.

Examples for 2 marks:

- … the view that there are no moral properties/facts (in the world)

Examples for 1 mark:

- … the view that morality/moral facts/moral properties are not real / there is no moral reality [the mention of real adds imprecision that is not present in the above example for 2 marks]
- … the view that the terms that are used in moral language do not refer to mind-independent facts/properties [an imprecise way of saying that these terms have no such reference]
- … the view that moral terms do not refer to anything in the world

Examples for 0 marks:

- … the view that moral language / judgments do not exist (in a mind-independent world)
- …the view that ethics (or ethical language) is non-cognitive

Students getting one or two marks will likely be because they make a mistake or included redundant material, rather than because they give a partial answer. The sorts of mistakes that students might make include:
- giving a definition of moral non-cognitivism (which is typically associated with moral anti-realism) instead of moral anti-realism - this kind of response is likely to centre on the nature of moral discourse, language, terms, claims etc.
- giving a definition of error theory (which combines cognitivism with anti-realism) instead of (just) moral anti-realism – a student that does this cannot get more than one mark

**Note:**
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

| 0 | 7 | Explain Kant's distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of duty.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|---|---|
| 5 | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy. |
| 4 | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy. |
| 3 | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2 | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear. |
| 1 | Fragmented points, with no logical structure. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

| Acting (merely) in accordance with duty | Acting out of (i.e. from/because of) duty |
|---|---|
| Both involve a person carrying out exactly the same action (as far as the external/bodily facts are concerned (i.e. they may both say the words "That is £5 please"). | |
| What the person does is what duty commands that they do, but s/he <u>has not</u> carried out this action because s/he has recognised this as his/her duty… | What the person does is what duty commands that s/he does, and s/he <u>has</u> carried out this action because s/he has recognised this as his/her duty… |
| …and rather has done it for some other reason. | …and not for some other reason. |
| S/he does not have (and has not acted out of) a good will. | S/he has (and has acted out of) a good will. |
| His/her action does not have moral worth. | His/her action has moral worth. |
| Kant gives the example of someone who deals honestly with an inexperienced customer only because they don't want to lose customers... | …versus someone who is honest because they have recognised that it is their moral duty to do so. |
| He also gives the example of someone who stays alive because they enjoy life… | …versus someone who does not commit suicide despite the fact that they hate life. |
| S/he has acted according to a hypothetical imperative: "Do X if you will Y". | S/he has acted according to a categorical imperative: "Do X (regardless of what you will)". |
| S/he is acting heteronomously (s/he is driven by (and is a slave to) an unchosen feeling). | S/he is acting autonomously (s/he is acting according to a chosen moral law). |

- The indicative content above is very full – students are not expected to discuss all/most of these to have a top level answer. Rather, the indicative content suggests relevant material students could draw upon to explain the distinction.
- However, in a response that scores 5 marks (a full answer), it is likely that students will employ some key concepts relating to Kantian Deontology (such as those contained in indicative content) in their explanation of the distinction. Examples include but are not limited to: reason, duty, hypothetical vs categorical imperatives, universal/unconditional commands, the good will, motivation)

0 8    Explain why Hume thinks that moral judgements are not beliefs.

**[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|---|---|
| 5 | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy. |
| 4 | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy. |
| 3 | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2 | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear. |
| 1 | Fragmented points, with no logical structure. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

The argument that Hume gives for this conclusion runs as follows:
- P1: Beliefs, by themselves, never motivate us to act (and nor do they necessarily cause any other states that do)
- P2: Sincere moral judgements (e.g. lying is wrong), by themselves, motivate us (at least to some extent) towards action (or necessarily cause another state that does).
- C1: Therefore, moral judgments are not (or, at least, do not express) beliefs.

Students may explain the premises, so here is some further information about each one and about the conclusion reached.

P1: Beliefs, by themselves, never motivate us to act (and nor do they necessarily cause any other states that do).

- This is known as Motivational Humeanism because it was first proposed by Hume who says: "*'Tis from the prospect of pleasure or pain that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object...reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will...[reason alone] can never oppose passion in the direction of the will";* and *"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them".*
- if beliefs were sufficient to motivate us, then we would expect people with the same beliefs to be motivated in the same way – but this is not the case
- the function of beliefs is to accurately represent reality (unlike the function of desires which is to motivate us to change (or maintain) the way reality is).

P2: Sincere moral judgements (e.g. lying is wrong), by themselves, motivate us [at least to some extent] towards action (or necessarily cause another state that does).

- There is support for this being Hume's view: *"Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of reason".*
- The square-bracketed qualification is not necessary, but might be mentioned.

C1: Therefore, moral judgments are not (or, at least, do not express) beliefs.

- This follows logically from P1 and P2 and students might state that it is a claim made by non-cognitivists. If moral judgements do not express belief states then they must express non-cognitive states.

Other approaches:

Students may use some other aspect of Hume's Philosophy and apply this within the context of the question to explain Hume's view that moral judgments are not beliefs. These alternative approaches, whether used in conjunction with the above argument or instead of it, should be credited.

- Hume's fork:
  - P1: beliefs [some students may refer to beliefs as 'judgments of reason'] are either (about) relations of ideas or matters of fact
  - P2: moral judgments are neither relations of ideas nor matters of fact
  - C1: Therefore, moral judgments are not beliefs

- Hume's is-ought gap:
  - P1: Beliefs are cognitive / descriptive / tell us about what *is* the case
  - P2: moral judgments tell us what *ought* to be the case (this point could be linked to motivation)
  - C1: Therefore (possibly using a principle such as Leibniz' law), moral judgments are not beliefs

As with the argument above, these other approaches could be explained/developed further at each stage in the argument.

**Note:**
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

| 0 | 9 | Explain how Aristotelian virtue ethics might be applied to the issue of simulated killing.

**[12 marks]**

AO1= 12

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|-------------------------------|
| 10–12 | The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 7–9 | The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 4–6 | The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response. |
| 1–3 | There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

**Outline of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics**

Aristotle's ethical view, in general, is based around the development of good moral character (as opposed to the following of moral rules, or the maximising of pleasure).

When discussing what Aristotle might say on this issue students are likely to make reference to one or more of the following aspects:
- 'The good' for human beings: the meaning of Eudaimonia as the 'final end' and the relationship between Eudaimonia and pleasure
- the function argument and the relationship between virtues and function
- Aristotle's account of virtues and vices
- virtues as character traits/dispositions and the importance of feelings
- the role of education/habituation in the development of a moral character
- the skill analogy
- the doctrine of the mean and its application to particular virtues
- the relationship between virtues, actions and reasons and the role of practical reasoning/practical wisdom.

Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary actions.

Simulated killing is the enactment of a dramatisation of killing within a fictional context, eg in computer games, films and plays.

Students may consider one of more of the following.
- The morality of enacting such a killing involving free choices for the enactor about how/when it is done (e.g. by controlling a created character in a video game).
- The morality of enacting such a killing involving no free choice for the enactor about how/when (eg by playing a character in a film/play).
- The morality of witnessing such a simulated killing.

In relating this to the issue of simulated killing, there are many points that students might make which include the following.
- Carrying out simulated killing might damage the character of the person/witnesses i.e. might prevent the habituation of the virtues and encourage viciousness (more so in the case of enactors than witnesses). NB: the empirical evidence does not suggest this.
- It might be claimed that whether it is morally justifiable might depend on the details of the specific example: What kind of pleasure is being taken in the simulated violence? When and why? Who is being killed and for what reason? In the context of a computer game the answers to this may bring in the narrative of the game.
- Although not on the specification, some might make a link to Aristotle's views on the importance of catharsis (eg what he says about tragedy). Simulated killing might be an opportunity to deal with negative emotions in a safe way.

**Note:**
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

| 1 | 0 | Are utilitarians correct when they say that it is morally right to maximise utility?

**[25 marks]**

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|--------------------------------|
| 21–25 | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.<br>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.<br>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.<br>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.<br>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 16–20 | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.<br>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.<br>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.<br>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.<br>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.<br>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 11–15 | A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.<br>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.<br>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.<br>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.<br>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument. |
| 6–10 | The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.<br>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.<br>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.<br>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently. |

| 1–5 | There is little evidence of an argument.<br>There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.<br>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.<br>There is some basic use of philosophical language. |
|---|---|
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

**Indicative content:**

- Credit can be given for responses which consider (a) utilitarianism in general, (b) focus on one particular version of utilitarianism, or (c) consider two or more versions in the course of the essay.

General points:
- utilitarians (as consequentialists) decide whether actions are morally right or wrong based on their effects
- the best decision is the decision that maximises utility (creates the greatest net utility) (NB: utility can be understood in different ways (see below))
- a utilitarian would consider the effects on happiness of all those affected; no-one would be ignored during the calculating process (impartiality: "every man to count for one, nobody for more than one" (Bentham)).

Credit can be given for consideration of one or more versions of utilitarianism (made complicated by the fact that utilitarians differ in their answers to various questions, forming a complex matrix of possible positions).

Which consequences matter?/What is meant by 'utility'?
- The quantity of pleasurable sensations (Jeremy Bentham's quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism (his utility calculus)).
- The quality of pleasure (John Stuart Mill's qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism (higher and lower pleasures).
- The satisfaction of preferences (preference utilitarianism – Hare and Singer).
- Various 'ideals'/values (ideal utilitarianism – Moore).

The consequences of what?
- Particular acts (act utilitarianism).
- Rules (rule utilitarianism).

The consequences for whom?
- Do animals count?
- Do all human beings count, and if not, what are the criteria?

Possible lines of argument:

**NO:** Utilitarianism is not correct: arguments/points against ('external' criticism/debates)

Problems with calculation:
- difficulties with predicting/knowing the relevant consequences
- difficulties with measuring utility (e.g. for Mill, is any amount of 'higher' pleasure of more value than an infinite amount of 'lower' pleasure?)

- utilitarianism has the strange result that we cannot know whether we have done the right thing until after we have done it (and we may never know) – a related point: is it actual or expected consequences that matter in terms of the rightness of the decision made?
- how much of the future can, or ought, the calculation take into account?
- difficulties with making calculations quickly and accurately enough for the right decision to be made in time (and rule utilitarianism as a possible response to this concern).

Issues that utilitarianism presents regarding fairness and individual liberty/rights (including the risk of the 'tyranny of the majority'):
- it risks a majority tyrannising over a minority (if that maximises utility)
- it fails to take seriously the distinctness of persons (Rawls)
- it treats people only as a means to an end, violating the Kantian principle– so Kant may be used to make this point
- the point about fairness may be put in economic terms, i.e. as an argument that a utilitarian distribution of wealth would not be a fair distribution (which might be argued on various grounds)
- rights/liberties are a way of avoiding the issues above (('negative') rights to non-interference and/or ('positive') rights of provision)
- rule utilitarianism might be brought in and evaluated as a response to this concern.

Utilitarianism ignores both the moral integrity and the intentions of the individual (e.g. the desire to do good):
- Virtue ethics may be discussed in this context as the right (and a better) account (the morally right thing to do is that which is the expression of virtue and virtuous character)
- Utilitarians may respond by arguing that they are able to morally evaluate motive and character so long as this is itself done on utilitarian grounds.

Issues around partiality: utilitarianism ignores the possible moral status of particular relationships (family/friendship) we may have with others, and indeed ignores the special duty we may have to ourselves.
- Singer's example of the drowning child and donations to charity might be discussed in this context (he, as a utilitarian, argues that nationality and distance are not in themselves morally relevant factors).
- This point may be linked to the following point.

Utilitarianism is too demanding on us – it requires us to do 'supererogatory' acts (acts which are normally seen as praiseworthy but not obligatory).

Certain versions of utilitarianism take sensations of pleasure too seriously:
- Aristotelian critiques: pleasure, though important, is not the highest good for humans, since it is what we share with animals
- Kantian critiques: we should act out of duty rather than to attain/maximise happiness – it is God who will ensure that the 'highest good' (including happiness) will be achieved for those who do the right thing
- Nozick's experience machine: pleasure is not all we care about since we would not plug into a pleasure-machine; we also care about our experiences being 'real' and our desires really being realised/coming true. (This, for many, is a point in favour of preference utilitarianism.)

Counter-intuitive results: utilitarianism might ask us to do things which we intuitively think are wrong (eg removing the organs of a healthy person to save five lives, torturing the innocent child of a terrorist to obtain information about a bomb threatening thousands of people).

**NO:** Utilitarianism is not correct: arguments based on metaethics and the assumption that utilitarianism is naturalist (e.g. hedonistic naturalism):
- appeal to the is-ought gap (Hume)

- the naturalistic fallacy (Moore): 'good' cannot be defined/analysed in terms of any other (natural) property
- the open-question argument
- Mill's 'proof' the principle of utility fails
- moral disagreement: goodness cannot be happiness since there is not wide enough agreement on this.

**YES:** Utilitarianism is correct:
- Mill's 'proof' of the greatest happiness principle (which may then be assessed)
- the importance of consequences: if something (e.g. murder, lying) is bad and we are faced with the choice of acting in such a way that something bad will happen either way, consequences will then determine the morally proper act (e.g. in the trolley problem.)
- common sense: it is evident/obvious that everyone's ultimate concern is to maximise happiness/pleasure and minimise unhappiness/pain – i.e. one can ask "Why do X?" and eventually one will get to "Because it brings happiness" but one can't pursue it by then asking "Why seek happiness?"
- universality: takes into account all agents/all those capable of feeling pain/pleasure happiness/unhappiness, thus bringing animals into the moral sphere.
- practicality/ease: we can work out what to do using a clear 'decision procedure'.
- objectivity: the calculation above is objective and would give the same results for anyone
- egalitarian: each agent / relevant being counts as equal in the calculation (in the sense that one starts by treating each person as equal before calculations)
- focuses on human wellbeing and promotes benevolence towards others: we should each seek to maximise happiness of the greatest number
- provides a secular framework for ethics.

**DEPENDS:**
- Students may conclude that whether utilitarianism is correct depends on which version you take and dismiss/defend certain versions.

**Note:**
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.