

Cambridge International Examinations

Cambridge Pre-U Certificate

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY (PRINCIPAL)

9774/02

Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1

May/June 2015 2 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet/Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet.

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO NOT WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

Choose one of Topics 1 to 4.

Answer two questions.

You must answer **both** parts of the question in Section A and **one** question from Section B for the Topic you have chosen.

You should divide your time equally between the questions you attempt.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

The syllabus is approved for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as a Cambridge International Level 3 Pre-U Certificate.

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Choose one of Topics 1 to 4.

Answer two questions.

You must answer **both** parts of the question in Section A and **one** question from Section B for the Topic you have chosen.

You should divide your time equally between the questions you attempt.

Topic 1 Epistemology

Answer Question 1 and either Question 2 or Question 3.

Section A

The grounds on which idealism is advocated are generally grounds derived from the theory of knowledge, that is to say, from a discussion of the conditions which things must satisfy in order that we may be able to know them. The first serious attempt to establish idealism on such grounds was that of Bishop Berkeley. He proved first, by arguments which were largely valid, that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, 'in' the mind, in the sense that their existence would not continue if there were no seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting. So far, his contention was almost certainly valid, even if some of his arguments were not so. But he went on to argue that sense-data were the only things of whose existence our perceptions could assure us, and that to be known is to be 'in' a mind, and therefore to be mental. Hence he concluded that nothing could ever be known except what is in some mind, and that whatever is known without being in my mind must be in some other mind ...

There are in this [Berkeley's] argument a good many fallacies which have been important in the history of philosophy, and which it will be as well to bring to light. In the first place, there is a confusion engendered by the use of the word 'idea'. We think of an idea as essentially something in somebody's mind, and thus when we are told that a tree consists entirely of ideas, it is natural to suppose that, if so, the tree must be entirely in minds. But the notion of being 'in' the mind is ambiguous.

[Extract from Bertrand Russell: The Problems of Philosophy: Ch.4, 'Idealism']

- 1 With reference to this passage and to Russell's views on Berkeley:
 - (a) Give a brief overview of Russell's account of Berkeley's idealism, and explain how Russell objects to it. [10]
 - (b) 'Berkeley's idealism can stand up to any objections.' Critically assess this claim. [15]

Section B

2 Analyse foundationalism as a theory of knowledge.

[25]

OR

3 Critically assess objections to phenomenalist theories of perception.

[25]

Topic 2 Philosophical and Theological Language

Answer Question 4 and either Question 5 or Question 6.

Section A

The traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful. The surest way to end them is to establish beyond question what should be the purpose and method of a philosophical enquiry ... We may begin by criticizing the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense. Later on, when we come to define metaphysics and account for its existence, we shall find that it is possible to be a metaphysician without believing in a transcendent reality; for we shall see that many metaphysical utterances are due to the commission of logical errors, rather than to a conscious desire on the part of their authors to go beyond the limits of experience. But it is convenient for us to take the case of those who believe that it is possible to have knowledge of a transcendent reality as a starting-point for our discussion. The arguments which we use to refute them will subsequently be found to apply to the whole of metaphysics.

One way of attacking a metaphysician who claimed to have knowledge of a reality which transcended the phenomenal world would be to inquire from what premises his propositions were deduced. Must he not begin, as other men do, with the evidence of his senses? And if so, what valid process of reasoning can possibly lead him to the conception of a transcendent reality? Surely from empirical premises nothing whatsoever concerning the properties, or even the existence, of anything super-empirical can legitimately be inferred ... For we shall maintain that no statement which refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of all possible sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must follow that the labours of those who have striven to describe such a reality have all been devoted to the production of nonsense.

... Our charge against the metaphysician is ... that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. Nor are we ourselves obliged to talk nonsense in order to show that all sentences of a certain type are necessarily devoid of literal significance. We need only formulate the criterion which enables us to test whether a sentence expresses a genuine proposition about a matter of fact, and then point out that the sentences under consideration fail to satisfy it ... The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability.

[Extract from **A.J. Ayer**: Language, Truth and Logic: Ch.1, 'The Elimination of Metaphysics']

- 4 With reference to this passage and to Ayer's views on the elimination of metaphysics:
 - (a) Explain how Ayer attempts to eliminate metaphysics.

[10]

(b) 'Ayer fails to eliminate metaphysics.' Discuss.

[15]

Section B

5 'Good cannot be a factual property.' Discuss.

[25]

OR

6 Assess critically the view that Wittgenstein's concept of language games provides a complete understanding of religious language. [25]

Topic 3 Philosophy of Religion

Answer Question 7 and either Question 8 or Question 9.

Section A

Anguish is a quality of experience whose nature could not be communicated by description to someone who had never undergone it; and we can in fact conceive of personal creatures who have always been entirely free from it. However, we human beings are not of such a breed, and have no great difficulty in communicating with one another about the forms of human misery. Attempting, then, to define an all-too-common dimension of our experience, I would suggest that by suffering we mean that state of mind in which we wish violently or obsessively that our situation were otherwise. Such a state of mind involves memory and anticipation, the capacity to imagine alternatives, and (in man) a moral conscience. For the characteristic elements of human suffering are such relatively complex and high-level modes of consciousness as regret and remorse; anxiety and despair; guilt, shame, and embarrassment; the loss of someone loved; the sense of rejection, of frustrated wishes, and of failure. These all differ from physical pain in that they refer beyond the present moment. To be miserable is to be aware of a larger context of existence than one's immediate physical sensations, and to be overcome by the anguished wish that this wider situation were other than it is.

Suffering, so characterized, is a function of sin. Our human experience can become an experience of suffering to us because we engage in it self-centredly. But in themselves our finitude, weakness, and mortality do not constitute situations from which we should violently wish to escape; if we were fully conscious of God and of His universal purpose of good we should be able to accept our life in its entirety as God's gift and be free from anguish on account of it.

[Extract from **John Hick**: Evil and the God of Love: Ch.XV, 'Suffering']

- 7 With reference to this passage and to Hick's views on suffering:
 - (a) Explain Hick's argument that suffering is ultimately about soul making and mystery. [10]
 - (b) Critically assess Hick's explanation of suffering. [15]

Section B

8 Critically examine cosmological arguments for the existence of God. [25]

OR

9 'Religion is the product of human psychology.' Discuss. [25]

Topic 4 New Testament: The Four Gospels

Answer Question 10 and either Question 11 or Question 12.

Section A

¹¹ Soon afterwards he went to a town called Nain, and his disciples and a large crowd went with him. ¹² As he approached the gate of the town, a man who had died was being carried out. He was his mother's only son, and she was a widow; and with her was a large crowd from the town. ¹³ When the Lord saw her, he had compassion for her and said to her, 'Do not weep.' ¹⁴ Then he came forward and touched the bier, and the bearers stood still. And he said, 'Young man, I say to you, rise!' ¹⁵ The dead man sat up and began to speak, and Jesus gave him to his mother. ¹⁶ Fear seized all of them; and they glorified God, saying, 'A great prophet has risen among us!' and 'God has looked favourably on his people!' ¹⁷ This word about him spread throughout Judea and all the surrounding country.

[Luke 7:11-17 NRSV]

- **10** (a) Examine what this passage shows about the person and role of Jesus. [10]
 - (b) 'Only the miracles in which Jesus raises someone from the dead show Jesus as God.'
 Critically assess this claim. [15]

Section B

11 'The Synoptic Gospels have no value since we do not know their authorship, dating or purpose.' Critically assess this claim. [25]

OR

12 'John's account of Jesus' trial before Pilate and of the crucifixion has more value as history than as theology.' Critically assess this claim.[25]

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